

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN LIBERALISM, MARXISM AND ISLAM

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Foreword

The contemporary man is essentially confronted with the same problem that had confronted his ancestors of yore --- the problem of making judicious adjustments between a multiplicity of identities, of harmonizing a variety of loyalties. For, as always, the contemporary man also has a sense of belonging to a number of collective entities, small and large. He belongs at one and the same time to his family, to his neighbourhood, to his vocational group, to a certain territorial unit, and to an ethnic or linguistic group with which he identifies. Above all, he is also conscious of belonging, apart from every other identity, to humanity.

Thus there do exist today, as there existed in the past, several focal points of man's loyalty. Thanks to this, there persists the problem of grappling with the claims of different, even competing identities on man's loyalty, and of adjusting those loyalties in a manner that would conduce to the well-being of the individuals as well as the various groups to which they belong.

I

In pre-modern times, men were generally inclined to view themselves as belonging primarily to the communities formed around devotion to a cluster of religious beliefs and practices such as Islam and Christianity. The idea that one owes one's loyalty primarily to one's nation, or to one's fatherland, hardly existed. This idea,

which came to be termed as nationalism, arose sometime in the eighteenth century and has been, since then, an extremely potent force in human history. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries nationalism played a major role in re-drawing the map of Europe; in fact its influence gradually embraced a much wider area, leading to major political developments in many parts of the world. In the name of nationalism, scattered segments of humanity were integrated, as under its influence some of the bloodiest wars were fought and human beings were annihilated on a scale hardly known ever before. At no point in modern history, however, did the tension between loyalty to the nation and to other groups --- both smaller and larger than the nation -- altogether disappear. Nevertheless, loyalty and devotion to the nation has generally remained the dominant sentiment and has usually been recognized as such at least ever since the French revolution.

Gradually, however, the idea of belonging to the entire human race -- an idea that had always been alive --- assumed increasing importance, and especially so after the First World War. The phenomenal advancements in transport and communication also heightened this feeling --- and this despite the vestiges of racist doctrines --- of a common humanity. In the post-Second World War period it even began to be visualized that in the course of time the hold of nationalism would greatly weaken, that the nations of the world would move towards some kind of a closely knit international community, and the barriers dividing man from man would ultimately be demolished.

II

The developments that have taken place during the last two or three decades, however, have startled many students of politics and international relations. The countries under the influence of Western Liberalism have undoubtedly seen in many parts of the world the weakening of the nationalist feeling in its conventional sense. On the other hand, they have also witnessed the rise of movements motivated by national sentiments as well as those focused on narrower, ethnic entities. Curiously enough, they have also witnessed alongside that the rise of larger trans-national groupings such as the European Community, and an increased emphasis of the idea of an international community.

Likewise, the countries which had come under the influence of Marxism also encountered some highly unexpected developments. Under the banner of Marxism the workers of the world were expected to unite for, in the words of the *Communist Manifesto*, they had nothing to lose but their chains. Not only did the dream of a universal Marxist Eldorado prove chimerical, but the masses of humanity languishing under the Marxist dispensation conceived the Marxist order itself to constitute their chains and rose in rebellion against it, and did so partly under the inspiration of nationalism.

Coming to the Islamic world, the developments during the recent decades have been no less astonishing. Given the sustained prevalence of secularism across the world in the modern times, the revival of religion as the basis of group identity and statehood had begun to be conceived as well-nigh impossible. To the astonishment of many, in 1947 the fifth largest state of the world

came into existence precisely on the ground that those united by their belief in Islam had the right to a separate statehood in the South Asian Subcontinent. More recently too on a number of occasions, the world of Islam has witnessed very powerful expressions of transnational Islamic identity. At times the feeling for such an identity was felt to be so strong and intense among the Muslim masses that some political adventurers, who have been known for their brazen contempt for Islam, resorted to manipulating Islamic sentiments. Paradoxically enough, this revival of Islamic identity and this enhanced emphasis on a universal Muslim *ummah* has been paralleled, in some parts of the world of Islam, by the emergence of movements of narrow linguistic and ethnic nationalism, by the emergence of what in Islamic parlance would be dubbed as '*aṣabīyah*'. The result was that Muslims of one ethnic or linguistic group were seen pitted against those of another.

III

In the present work, Dr. Tahir Amin has embarked on the ambitious task of surveying the twentieth century developments at the intellectual level as to how the prominent thinkers of three traditions --- Liberalism, Marxism and Islam --- have wrestled with the problem of man's multiple identities. The information and insights provided by the author should undoubtedly foster greater understanding of these three traditions and a better appreciation of the implications of these three world-views for their adherents as well as for the world at large. It is obvious that these benefits will not be exclusively confined to the realm of the intellect. The insights gained would hopefully enable the followers of these

different world-views to engage in a more meaningful dialogue and would equip them for a more fruitful interaction.

It is true that at the present Marxism seems to be speedily receding into the background to an extent that at the moment it appears to be growing into an object of historical rather than practical interest. The present decline of Marxism should, however, not detract from the fact that during the greater part of the present century it had inspired millions of people, had shaped their outlook, and had given rise to a large number of economic and political institutions in a very large part of the world. True, the current disillusionment with Marxism seems so profound and widespread that its recrudescence in the very near future would appear beyond the range of the probable. However, if history teaches anything, it teaches that ideas die hard; that they appear, disappear and then re-appear in cycles.

With the speedy receding of Marxism from the intellectual and political scene of the world, the significance of the Islamic and the Western liberal traditions will, in all likelihood, correspondingly enhance, and their interaction --- friendly or otherwise --- will assume added significance. In fact one can already see that not only the popular media of the West but even current Western scholarship have begun to give vent to an alarmist concern about Islam which is reminiscent of the scare which, not long ago, was associated with the Communist Bloc ---the mysterious world behind the iron curtains. The present Western mood about the Muslims even reminds one of the opening sentence of the Communist Manifesto in which Marx and Engels had dramatically started off by saying: 'A spectre is haunting Europe - the spectre of

Communism". With a slight change, it could be said today: "A spectre is haunting the West --- the spectre of Islam". The phobia of Islam --- "militant Islam" --- which at times assumes hysteric proportions in some sections of the Western society, and the fury and frenzy which characterize the unceasing tirade directed against "Islamic fundamentalism" only underscore the need of building bridges of understanding between the world of Islam and the rest of the world, especially the Western.

It is evident that the irrational fear of, not to speak of contempt for, Islam and Muslims that presently seems to have seized a fairly good number of people in the West is an undeniable reality. Unfortunately this remains the case despite the vogue of liberalism, and the erudition, courage and breadth of outlook of a number of Western scholars and intellectuals. It is also undeniable that Muslims, for a variety of reasons, reciprocate a good deal of the negative feelings that are expressed for them in the West. While these attitudes can be understood in terms of the historical encounter between Christendom and the world of Islam, it would seem that never before in history was it as imperative as it is today that men of different world-views should reach out to each other in an earnest effort to understand the inner dynamics of the world-views of each other and their potential to influence the relationships between human beings at the global level.

As one who has been for long interested in the problem of nationalism and internationalism, this writer feels that he has been enriched by carefully going through the present comparative study of the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism as encountered by thinkers who view problems from a Liberal, Marxist

or Islamic frame of reference. At the same time, as one who in the earlier part of his scholastic career had attempted to study the encounter between the nationalist idea and Islamic thought in the Arab world and the South Asian Subcontinent, it would perhaps not be altogether impertinent for him to highlight a few points, and to add perhaps a few observations relating mainly to the nature of the problem in the Islamic world even if they might be in the nature of adding footnotes to the contents of the learned author's work.

IV

To start with, it needs to be emphasized that it is not for the first time in its history that Islam has wrestled with the problem of competing loyalties. At the very time of its inception, Islam was faced with the challenge of *'aṣabīyah*, the moving spirit of the pre-Islamic social order. As we shall observe, *'aṣabīyah* was an idea which greatly resembled nationalism since it signified boundless and unconditional loyalty to the tribe or clan. The two bear striking resemblance in so far as while *'aṣabīyah* denotes supreme loyalty to the tribe, nationalism denotes supreme loyalty to the nation. Significantly enough, the motto of the sixth century Arabs was: "Help your brother [clansman]: right or wrong". Could anything be closer to the motto of the nationalists in the present century: "My nation: right or wrong"?

Islam strongly denounced tribal *'aṣabīyah* in the strongest terms. Whoever fights for or invites people to *'aṣabīyah*, according to the Prophet (peace be upon him), is "not from me" (See Muslim, "Imārah", 57). Rather than the tribe, Islam itself became the main

rallying-point, the major unifying force, the primary basis of communal cohesion. Thus, Muslims were held by the Qur'ān to be nothing but brothers to one another (49:10) and were declared by the Prophet (peace be upon him) to be "one hand" against all others (Abū Dā'ūd, "Jihād", 147). Was that designed to give birth to a new kind of chauvinism --- Islamic chauvinism? Was it intended to provide a rationale for Muslim self-aggrandizement?

The idea of establishing a universal entity based on common devotion to the One True God is in fact related to the basic mission of the Muslim *ummah*. Unlike a tribe, or a nation in the ordinary sense of the term, the Muslim *ummah* has not been raised to pursue its group interest, or to seek the fulfilment of its economic and political ambitions. It is an *ummah* which, rather than exist for its own sake, has been raised "for all mankind" (3:110). Moreover, they are an *ummah* with a mission --- the mission to uphold the word of God, to be witnesses of truth and justice, to constantly endeavour to promote good and oppose evil. This is not to say that collective entities other than the Muslims will never support what is good and never oppose what is evil. In the case of Muslims, however, to support what is right, to uphold what is just and to oppose what is evil constitute their very *raison d'être*, their essential mission. It is the pursuit of this mission which calls for the establishment of brotherhood among Muslims since mutual cooperation and support greatly strengthens them in the performance of their mission. This internal solidification of the Muslim ranks is primarily actuated by the desire to serve all mankind by making godliness and goodness, justice and fairplay, and benevolence and generosity prevail in human life. The Muslims have, therefore, always tended to regard their unity as a necessary means for

effectively operating in history for the realization of the higher goals set forth by Islam.

However, this idealist aspect of the outlook of the Muslims has never prevented them from giving due importance to the other ties that bind them to entities other than the Muslim *ummah*. It is not just that Islam recognizes these different entities as facts of life that are natural, and hence ought to be stoically accepted, but also as manifestations of God's infinite wisdom. "And among His signs", says the Qur'ān, "is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the variations in your languages and your colours" (30:22). Likewise, whereas the inherent oneness of all mankind is categorically affirmed by the Qur'ān, the division of humanity into such entities as tribes and nations has been attributed to God Himself; and while it is unjustified to consider affinity with any tribe or nation or race to be a true indicator of the inherent superiority of one group over the other, the division of mankind into different entities itself serves to facilitate knowing each other better (see the Qur'ān 49:13).

The teachings of Islam as embodied in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* and as applied in the history of the earliest period of Islam are indicative of Islam's balanced and moderate attitude in dealing with the problem multiple collective entities to which man belongs. This is evident from the fact that the Islamic requirement to place a very high value upon the Islamic entity did not lead to denying the value of other natural groups --- the family, the neighbourhood, the clan, or the tribe. There seems no reason why what was true of these relatively smaller entities known in the early period of Islam should not be true in respect of the larger entities in vogue

in the present age such as those based on common fatherland, or common language, or common culture.

The attitude that Islam adopted in respect of the tribe is especially instructive. It is true that Islam established a trans-tribal entity --- the Muslim *ummah*. It is also true that this *ummah* had a very high degree of claim upon a Muslim's loyalty. But what was the attitude of Islam to the very existence of the entity called 'tribe' or 'clan'? In our view, this attitude may be summed up by saying that Islam did not seek to destroy tribes and clans, nor did it ask the Muslims to completely sunder their ties with those entities. Islam cultivated in the Muslims an attitude of mind that would make them transcend rather than destroy tribes or clans. What Islam in fact sought to do was to destroy '*aṣabiyyah*' which might be roughly translated as tribal chauvinism. For Islam was strongly opposed to was the exaggerated loyalty to the tribe in vogue in the sixth century Arabia. This was because loyalty to the tribe or clan was placed above everything else so much so that even considerations of truth and falsehood, of right and wrong were subordinated to tribal interests. Nor did Islam approve the attitude of mind which would consider the tribal tie to be of greater importance than the religious tie that binds all Muslims into one *ummah*. Thus, the essence of the Islamic position was not that of denying as such the legitimacy of all entities other than the Islamic one. The Islamic position rather consisted of according supremacy to the entity woven around devotion to the One True God, acceptance of the Qur'ān as the Word of God, affirmation of Muhammad (peace be upon him) as the last and final Messenger of God, and belief in Islam as the true way of life for all mankind.

In the early period of Islam when Muslims appeared on the stage of history, they were a single political entity. This situation continued during the first century of Islam. But gradually the Muslim world split into a number of political entities. However, even when a multiplicity of states had become known realities of Muslim political life, Muslim scholars and thinkers never ceased to yearn for the unification of *Dār al-Islām*. Islam had provided a very solid infra-structure of unity which rested on a common world-view, common ethical norms, a common system of law, and a host of other common factors emanating from this basic unity of outlook. However, Muslim thinkers and scholars were usually not satisfied with the cultural unity that characterized their life. They generally kept up the ideal --- even if it be a remote and ultimate ideal --- of establishing a unified political framework in the form of a single Islamic state that would embrace all Muslim lands. (It seems worth exploring whether the authoritative Muslim scholars of the past were fully agreed about this or not. Further, it also needs to be explored as to what arguments were adduced from the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* to support the actual position taken, whatever they might be, on the issue).

V

In the highly changed conditions of the present-day world, Muslims are faced again with some of the problems that they had faced in the earlier periods of their history. While encountering the dilemma of nationalism and trans-national unity of the *ummah* several Muslim thinkers were completely swept off their feet and succumbed to the new-fangled nationalist ideology of a chauvinist variety. This is evident from the exaggerated exaltation of territorial

and linguistic entities in several Muslim countries. Let us consider a few concrete examples. In Egypt, for instance, the innocent sentiment of patriotism that came into prominence in the nineteenth century gradually changed into a movement of Egyptian exclusivism. Under its influence many Egyptian nationalists denied all ties between the Egyptian Muslims and their co-religionists in other parts of the world, became blind to the fact that ninety percent of the Egyptians were Muslims with strong Islamic roots, and even went so far as to glorify the Pharaohs and Pharaonism and to consider them the sources of their inspiration. Likewise, the movements of Iranian and Turkish nationalism at times evinced scant respect for Islam; in fact they seemed to make it a point to play down the Islamic factors in the collective life and historical experience of the Iranians and the Turks respectively. Indeed, despite the very close relationship between Islam and Arabism in history, the movement known as Arab nationalism came into sharp conflict with almost all the socio-political ideals cherished by Muslims throughout their history, and looked upon Islam merely as one of the numerous expressions of the genius of Arabism rather than as God's final message to all mankind.

It is no surprise that nationalism of the kind mentioned above has drawn the ire of those who seek to make Islam an operative factor in the life of the Muslims both at the individual and collective levels. Such persons perceive nationalism as a dangerous ideology with the potential to de-Islamize their socio-political life; as a sinister doctrine which threatens to shatter the unity of the Muslims, making them fall an easy prey to imperialist designs; as a retrograde ideology that raises barriers between man and man, driving each nation to seek aggrandizement at the cost

of the others; as a major cause of wars and bloodshed among the nations of the world; as a major factor in transforming the world into a house dangerously divided against itself.

The first impression that one gets from reading the writings of the contemporary Islamic thinkers and comparing them with the writings of the exponents of nationalism is that any reconciliation between Islam and nationalism must be altogether excluded. This impression is not altogether false especially if nationalism is interpreted in a manner which fundamentally negates the socio-political ideals of Islam. But a more careful reading of the exposition of socio-political ideas of Islamic thinkers is likely to lead to a somewhat different conclusion. It would reveal their disposition to view the dilemma of nationalism and trans-national Muslim unity with much greater calm-headedness and realism than is generally believed. In order to illustrate this, we would like to look cursorily at the writings of some Islamic thinkers of the present and the latter part of the previous century.

We would embark on this by considering, first of all, the relevant writings of Ḥasan al-Bannā (d. 1949), the founder of al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, one who fully fits into the Western stereotype of a "fundamentalist" and "militant" Islamist. Not unlike other Islamists, al-Bannā also emphasised that Islam is not merely a creed of the Muslims; it also constitutes their fatherland and nationality. He stressed that the Islamic fatherland comprises all Islamic lands. The idea that the collective identity of the Muslims is one and indivisible has also been very forcefully emphasised by al-Bannā.

Islam does not recognize these geographical boundaries and these racial and blood differences. It regards all Muslims as belonging to the same nationality and considers the Islamic fatherland one fatherland. (Hasan al-Bannā, *Risālat al-Mu'tamar al-Khāmīs*, Cairo, n.d., p.48).

He went on to say that "every piece of the earth where there lives a brother who follows the faith of the Qur'ān is a part of the common Islamic fatherland". (Hasan al-Bannā, *al-Rasā'il al-Thalāth*, Cairo, n.d., p.73).

It is because of such ideas that al-Bannā supported the ideal of emancipating all Muslim lands rather than just Egypt, or at the most the Arab world from foreign domination. (See *al-Bannā Bayn al-Ams wa al-Yawm*, Cairo, n.d., p.25). On the same grounds he held that aggression against one part of the Muslim world is aggression against the whole Muslim world. (Cited in Ishaq Musa Husaynī, *The Moslem Brethren*, Beirut, 1956, p.68).

All this is, however, one aspect of al-Bannā's thought. For al-Bannā's devotion to the unity of the Muslim *ummah* did not make him oblivious to the fact that he owed a special loyalty to Egypt. Al-Bannā seemed to visualize the Muslims to be living in several concentric circles so that loyalty to any one of those circles did not necessarily exclude loyalty to others. He expressed this idea by pointing out that a Muslim has, first of all, a broad, general nationality --- the Islamic nationality --- which is the fundamental and highly vital one. But alongside that a Muslim also has a particular nationality. A Muslim is thus bound by duties to both -- a general duty to the Islamic nationality and a particular duty

to the people among whom he lives. Al-Bannā enunciated this view as follows:

... the Ikhwān respect their particular nationality on the ground that it is the first foundation of their cherished renaissance. They do not consider it wrong that every person should work for his country and give precedence to it over other countries. After that, the Ikhwān support Arab unity as the next step towards the renaissance. Thereafter they strive for Pan-Islamism as a fence to protect the general Islamic fatherland. (*Risālat al-Mu'tamar al-Khāmīs*, op. cit., pp.49 f.).

He supported the theory of "particular nationality" by saying that:

Islam enjoins upon every person to strive for the good of his country and lose himself in its service and render utmost service to the nation (*ummah*) in which he lives, and to give precedence to kinship and neighbourliness [in acts of benevolence]. Due to the [principle of] preferring the ones who are close ... Islam does not allow the transfer of *zakāh* beyond the limits of *qasr* except when necessary. Hence a Muslim is the most deeply patriotic person and is benevolent towards his compatriots. This is so because it has been so ordained by God ... The Ikhwān are, for this reason, the keenest of all people in their desire for the good of their fatherland; they are completely self-denying in the service of their people; they wish for this great and glorious country all power and glory and all progress and advancement. (*Ibid.*, p.46).

It is clear from Hasan al-Bannā's writings that while he opposed the nationalist ideology, he was emphatic about some of

those objectives which the nationalists also seek to achieve. In this connection he coined a number of terms and expressions which indicate the shared area of objectives between him and others, including the nationalists. Al-Bannā made it clear, for instance, that he was not opposed to *waṭanīyat al-ḥanīn* (the nationalism of love) by which he meant the love for one's country. Far from being opposed to that, al-Bannā regarded such a love as one ingrained in human nature. This is evidenced by the fact that Bilāl and the Prophet (peace be upon him) used to feel restless whenever they remembered Makkah after *hijrah*. Al-Bannā also does not disagree with *waṭanīyat al-ḥurriyyah wa al-'izzah* (the nationalism of freedom and glory). By this al-Bannā meant the desire to see one's country free and to inculcate the love of freedom and honour in the souls of one's compatriots. Al-Bannā also did not disapprove of *waṭanīyat al-mujtama'* (the nationalism of social welfare). This, in al-Bannā's opinion, meant strengthening the ties that bind the individuals of the same country. He believed that far from being disapproved by Islam, it was in fact encouraged by it. In like manner, al-Bannā considered *qawmīyat al-ummah* which, in his view, denoted that a person owes his primary responsibility to his people. He also considered it altogether justified that a person should serve his own people prior to serving others. (See al-Bannā, *al-Rasā'il al-Thalāth*, op. cit., pp. 16-21).

Since the nationalists in the Muslim world have been generally opposed to Pan-Islamism it would be of some interest to explore as to what form of Islamic unity was visualized by the Pan-Islamists, including Ḥasan al-Bannā. A basic fact that strikes one about the Pan-Islamic movement is that while it has represented a certain trend of thought and indicated the general direction in

which the Muslims of the world ought to move --- the direction of Muslim unity --- it has not had a well-defined and clearly formulated political programme to bring that unity about. Also, Pan-Islamism did not necessarily require that all Islamic countries should be united in the form of a single Islamic state. There is no sign that even the most forceful protagonist of Pan-Islamism, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d.1897), to quote Albert Hourani, "had it in mind to create a single Islamic state or to revive the united caliphate of early times". (Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, p.116). Nor did Muḥammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), the main disciple of al-Afghānī, entertain such an idea. The practical form of Muslim unity visualised by him for the present age was one that would resemble the structure of the Germanic states [in his time]. These states, although independent, were united. (See Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Ta'rīkh al-Ustādh al-Imām*, vol. I, 1931, pp. 306 f.).

Coming to back to Ḥasan al-Bannā, we find that like all other Islamists, he also strongly supported the "integration of all parts of the Islamic fatherland which have been cut off from one another due to the machinations of the Western powers" (see al-Bannā, *Ilā al-Shabāb*, Cairo, n.d., p.9). And yet this integration is not conceived in terms of a single Islamic state embracing all Islamic countries. What this integration meant was that the Muslim countries should not be exclusively occupied with their own problems, but should cooperate with each other in solving the problems of the Muslims all over the world. In this connection al-Bannā wanted the formation of an Organization of Muslim Nations (*Hay'at al-Umam al-Islāmīyah*) which would embrace all Muslim nations, both Arab and non-Arab. Even though the concept of this

Organization is not very clear or elaborate, the scanty information available to us indicates that it was conceived more or less along the lines of the League of Arab States which, in this case, would cover all the Muslim countries. (See al-Bannā, *Mushkilātunā fī Ḍaw' al-Niẓām al-Islāmī*, Cairo, n.d., pp. 35 f.).

In order to illustrate the matter further, it would be worth our while to glance at what one of the most prominent jurists of the Arab world in recent years, Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, has to say on the issue of Pan-Islam. In an article entitled *al-Jāmi'ah al-Islāmīyah* (Pan-Islam) serialized in *al-Muslimūn*, Abū Zahrah addressed himself to the problem of the structure of Islamic unity. Like other Islamists Abū Zahrah also strongly pleads for Pan-Islam. Nevertheless, Abū Zahrah traces the political history of Islam in order to argue that the ideal of Islamic unity in the form of one single Islamic state did not last long. He even goes on to say that it could not last long. Such a unity was possible only when Islam had not spread beyond the "land of the Arabs". It became impossible to maintain unity in the form of a single state after the conquests brought vast territories under the Islamic domain. Abū Zahrah seems to regard this development as natural. (See *ibid.*, pp.125-27). Therefore, instead of pleading for unity in the form of a unified Islamic state, he pleads for the formation of an Islamic League comprising all Muslim states. This Islamic League should, in the opinion of Abū Zahrah, unite the Islamic world in the following manner:

1. It should lead to an Islamic political union by which Abū Zahrah means that the Islamic League should have a council

to ensure that the Islamic states follow a uniform foreign policy *vis-a-vis* the non-Muslim states.

2. It should foster economic cooperation in order to enable the Islamic countries to establish an economy which might not be dependent upon, or interlinked with the economies of Europe, U.S.A. or U.S.S.R. This object is desirable in order that Muslims might not remain an appendix of any of the world economic blocs, and may be able to apply the laws of their religion in the economic sphere of their life.
3. It should also lead to linguistic unity founded on "the language of the Qur'ān", a unity that will subsequently lead to cultural unity. (See *ibid.*, p.128).

Abū Zahrah also desires that the Islamic League should serve the purpose of maintaining Islamic brotherhood. This purpose, in his view, can be achieved by preventing Islamic countries from fighting among themselves either in war or on the political or economic fronts. (See *ibid.*, p.123).

The unity that Abū Zahrah conceives is one that would be founded on the basis of the Qur'ān and its laws. The common, unifying factor will be the Islamic faith, although individual Islamic countries should still have the right to choose for themselves the form of government they like best. According to Abū Zahrah, the same was the view of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī. (See *ibid.*, p.127). (For other Muslim thinkers of the modern Islamic world who do not visualize the goal of unifying all Muslim countries into a single state see James P. Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States*,

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, especially chapters 4 and 5).

VI

As Muslims, along with the rest of the world, stand on the threshold of the twenty-first century, the problem of multiple identities continues to stare them in the face, demanding that their intellectual and political leaders engage in a serious attempt to come forth with ideas that would enable every Muslim to adopt appropriate attitudes towards the Muslim *ummah*, the territorial and ethnic units to which he belongs, to all his compatriots including the non-Muslims, and to mankind at large. In the fifties and the early sixties Muslims had veered too much in one direction. Secular nationalism then seemed to have become the dominant ideology of the Muslims of a greater part of the world and the idea of trans-national Muslim unity seemed to be receding into oblivion. This writer distinctly recalls that in the mid-sixties *The Economist*, London, while commenting on one of the inter-Islamic conferences held at that time had sarcastically said that it was the last conference of its kind! After the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War of 1967, however, the tide began to turn and the idea of Muslim solidarity gradually emerged as a force to contend with. This idea eventually found expression in several inter-Islamic organizations, especially the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). It is true that up to now Islamic unity has not been able to express itself, at the institutional level, with the desired degree of effectiveness. But over and over again Muslims have unmistakably shown that the feeling of Muslim unity flows in their veins. It would be an act of myopic unrealism if the political

leaders of the Muslim countries were to formulate their policies in disregard of this undesirable fact.

It seems necessary, therefore, that Muslim intellectuals should come forth with ideas that would lead to solving the identity problems of the *ummah*. It cannot be over-emphasized that in grappling with this problem, as with any other, Muslims should be turn primarily to their intellectual resources and historical experience, and should specially be guided by the teachings of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. However, in areas of life where changes take place at a rapid pace requiring the re-structuring of institutions, application of the teachings of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* would require much greater wisdom, familiarity with existing realities, and far-sightedness than when those teachings have to be applied to such fields of life as 'ibādāt (rituals) where change seems to have a minimal impact. As for the problem in hand, it is significant that the guidance provided by the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* is less specific, less categorical and less elaborate than in the field just mentioned, a guidance available more in the form of ideals and objectives than of elaborate rules.

In dealing with the problem in question, therefore, it would be necessary for the Muslim scholars and thinkers of the present times to identify, first of all, the texts of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* which bear relevance to the problem, and to carefully examine how those texts have been interpreted by Muslim scholars and thinkers in different periods of history, and to explore the extent of the consideration shown by them to the changing realities of life. It would also be useful to note the relationship between the ideas of the scholars and the efforts of men of practical concerns in raising

structures inspired by those ideas. And last, but not the least, it would be necessary to become deeply acquainted with the realities of the modern age --- the concepts and doctrines prevalent in different parts of the world, the ground realities of modern life, the complexities of international politics and economy, and the dynamics of the institutions that have come into existence to achieve a variety of conflicting interests and purposes. In our view, unless these requirements are fulfilled, there can be no serious and responsible Islamic thinking on questions such as those mentioned above.

We hope, however, that once streams of fresh thinking begin to flow, the *ummah* will start pulsating with a new life characterized by clarity of vision and profusion of energy. Such a thinking will hopefully be at once authentically Islamic and contemporaneously relevant and meaningful. It will be both "traditional" and creative. It will combine the instinct to conserve with the urge to innovate and to venture out along untrodden paths. It will be firmly rooted in the past and yet will evince no fear to add whatever is found by human experience to be useful to the already rich and valuable intellectual heritage of the *ummah*. Inspired by the Qur'an, such a thinking will exhibit a passion to innovate, to make ever new experiments, to build ever new structures to actualize the Islamic vision of life and contribute to the over-all well-being of humanity. Islam's potential to direct the course of history and to enrich human civilization has hardly been exhausted by its achievements in the past. In the face of new opportunities and challenges, that potential is likely to come into full play. For, as Muhammad Iqbal believed, a hundred fresh worlds and a multitude of epochs are latent in the verses of the Qur'an. If only Muslims are blessed with faith and

vision, a whole new world and a new epoch might burst forth on the stage of history.

Islamabad

Jumādā al-Thānī, 1412

December 1991

Zafar Ishaq Ansari

Preface

The question of nationalism versus internationalism has been the central dilemma of humanity in contemporary history. It continues to remain unresolved despite a significant degree of attention from scholars belonging to different cultural traditions. This study, based on a survey of the twentieth century writers in three important traditions - Liberalism, Marxism and Islam - is an attempt to create both an awareness of significant debates within different traditions on the subject, and to underscore the necessity of a genuine international dialogue based on respect of each other's values - steps which seem absolutely necessary to build a more peaceful world order.

This study, which was originally presented at a seminar organized by the International Institute of Islamic Thought in Islamabad will also form part of a larger project on theories of world order to be co-authored by Hayward R. Alker, Jr. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, U.S.A.), Thomas J. Biersteker (University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Tahashi Inuguchi (University of Tokyo) and Tahir Amin (Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad). The purpose of this project is to understand various traditions of international relations across the globe. The intent is not only to gain an insight into the fundamental premises of alternative world-views but also to contribute to a truly international dialogue.

I am grateful to Hayward R. Alker Jr., Thomas J. Biersteker and Tahashi Inuguchi for giving me valuable comments on an earlier version of this study presented at the annual meeting of International Studies Association held at Anaheim, California in 1986. I am also grateful to the participants of the seminar held under the auspices of International Institute of Islamic Thought in Islamabad for their insightful comments. In particular, I am thankful to Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Ijaz Gilani, Anwar Siddiqi, Anis Ahmad and others. My thanks are also due to Nazli Choucri and Nazif Shahrani for giving useful comments on the paper submitted to the above-mentioned seminar. Zafar Ishaq Ansari's persistent interest, very useful critical feedback, and a thorough editing of the manuscript made the publication of this study in its present form possible. Finally, I am thankful to Tahir Farkhan Ahmad for patiently typing and retyping various drafts of this study.

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Tahir Amin

Introduction

Scholars in different cultural traditions have long been pre-occupied with the issue of nationalism versus internationalism. The famous Western historian Arnold Toynbee, who considered nationalism a negative force in history, visualized it as a merely transitional phenomenon and regarded the dominance of Western liberal internationalism as a fact of life.¹ Karl Marx, the founder of the Marxist tradition also considered nationalism a temporary phase and saw the movement of history eventually culminating in proletarian internationalism.² Muhammad Iqbal, a renowned Muslim philosopher of the contemporary Muslim world, also envisioned the emergence of a supra-national Muslim community, the *ummah*, in the near future.³ These writers, whether Liberal, Marxist or Islamic, envisioned rather prematurely⁴ an early demise of nationalism and the victory of their preferred brand of internationalism.

However, the cyclical rise of nationalism and its continuing resilience have confounded their expectations. The history of nationalism, in broad strokes, can be seen in terms of three waves across the globe. The first wave began with the French revolution (1879) and stretched upto the Second World War, transforming the face of the Western world. The second wave began with the end of the Second World War to the early 1970s and led to the decolonization and independence of most of the developing countries. As for the third wave, it appeared in the form of the rise of ethno-national movements during 1970s and continues to affect the whole

of the world to this day.⁵ This makes one consider afresh several significant questions about nationalism which had been raised and answered before: What is nationalism? Why has it remained so powerful? Will nation-states continue to exist for ever? Is there any hope for the triumph of internationalism?

We shall attempt in the following pages to study both the phenomenon of nationalism and internationalism across three diverse cultural traditions: Liberalism, Marxism, and Islam, and try to assess the approaches from a comparative perspective.

Significance of the Study

The significance of the study of nationalism may be assessed both in theoretical as well as practical terms. There is a need to understand the phenomenon of nationalism more rigorously because of its multi-dimensional implications for international relations. It has led to the re-drawing of the state boundaries along national lines, transforming the entire face of global politics. It has also been instrumental in generating national rivalries, imperialist wars and the two World Wars. It has played a central role in the development of the contemporary system, but it is surprising to note that the theorists of international relations have not paid sufficient attention to its study despite the fact that it continues to vitally affect the fate of international relations.⁶ Recent assessments of the literature on nationalism conclude that our understanding of the subject remains "undeveloped".⁷

From a practical angle, this study raises the following significant questions: Is the nation-state the only rational form of

organizing humanity? Should human beings necessarily remain prisoners of the nation-state having the sole and exclusive monopoly over interaction among human beings? Would we always remain in the world of passports, visas and other restrictions placed by the custodians of the nation-states? Are there any alternatives to the existing system of nation-states?

Recent changes in the world order demonstrate the need to understand a variety of internationalisms in their proper cultural contexts. The Western world is already moving beyond the confines of the nation-state and heading towards the formation of a supra-national community. Foreign policies of the Western countries, as has been demonstrated in the recent Gulf War between Iraq and the allied forces led by the USA, are already working in unison within one cultural framework. There have also been significant developments in domestic issue-areas to make Europe a unified supra-national community. The Marxist world is passing through a transitional phase. It is difficult to make any speculative conjecture at this stage, but it is evident that both the USSR and its former East European empire are in the process of great transformation and are bound to face further disintegration along ethno-national lines. It is also likely that the USSR and their erstwhile East European allies may entirely abandon their Marxist legacies and choose to become a part of the West. In fact our analysis in this paper considers the Marxist tradition as part of the West. It will not be surprising if the former adversaries may become new allies and the Soviet Union may choose to accept the role of a junior partner to the West.

As for the Muslim world, it is caught up between two trends. One of these is loyalty to the nation-state - a legacy from the colonial time which continues to persist at the state level. On the other hand, Islamic revivalism has evoked a strong response at the societal level and its eventual aim is to create a unified Muslim community (the *ummah*). This has again been strongly demonstrated during the recent Gulf War between Iraq and the Western allies led by the USA, the Iraqi decision-makers, despite their otherwise known contempt for Islamic orientation, were able to capitalize on the symbols of Islamic resurgence and mobilize a short-lived wave of public sympathy across the Muslim world, making the Muslim states realize their extreme vulnerability in the face of Islamic transnationalism.

Is a dialogue possible across these culturally diverse internationalisms? We believe that much of the literature in the discipline of international relations, whether in the Liberal, Marxist or Islamic traditions, primarily revolves around communitarian internationalism. By communitarian internationalism we mean an attempt to find the basis of co-operation beyond the nation-state but confined to homogeneous countries conceived as a community in cultural terms. There is little or no discussion at the global international level. By global internationalism we mean a consensus on a world order based on certain basic values and goals shared across culturally diverse communities. One of the main purposes of this study is to create an awareness and understanding of diverse world views. Our hope is that a better understanding across different cultural traditions would generate respect for each other's values and new ways to find a more peaceful global world order.

The Main Argument

The dominant theme in the current literature on nationalism is that humanity is naturally divided into nation-states and, given the persistence of the state system, nationalism is now a systemic and self-reproducing system.⁸ This theme is also in accord with the neo-realist perspective, the dominant paradigm in the contemporary Western discourse of international relations which takes the nation-state as its point of departure and considers it a universal form.

Surveying modern representative literature on the subject of nationalism and internationalism in three cultural traditions - Liberalism, Marxism and Islam - there are two basic arguments of this work. First, that nationalism is a form of politics whose origins lie in the Western liberal culture which has come to dominate the world in the wake of the emergence of contemporary Western international system. It is neither a natural nor an ever-lasting doctrine. It is merely a coincidence that nationalism, the ideology of the Western educated middle class, became popular the world over due to a variety of factors, but its sway is being seriously challenged by a variety of communitarian internationalisms in different parts of the world. Taking one case of such communitarian internationalism, Islamic revivalism, it is argued that in the Muslim world, comprising one-fifth of the world's population, nationalism is locked into serious battle with Islamic transnationalism, a battle whose outcome is as yet undecided.⁹ But it is recognized now by both Liberal and Marxist observers that the resurgence of Islam is the most significant transnational phenomenon of the contemporary Muslim world.¹⁰ This was also significantly demonstrated in the 1978 Islamic revolution of Iran which, notwithstanding the fact

that its Pan-Islamic professions were gradually overshadowed by the narrow sectarianism which became an increasingly conspicuous factor in shaping its policies, it was precisely its Islamic and Pan-Islamic professions which initially created a wide base of support for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The popular resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the on-going Muslim struggles in Palestine and Kashmir have all received the support of Muslims across the globe. In all these cases, the resistance movements were justified in terms of Islamic transnationalism.

Secondly, the misunderstanding of Islamic communitarian internationalism is common in both the Liberal and Marxist traditions. The word 'fundamentalism' is commonly used in the West to give a bad name to Islamic revivalism, thereby implying that the Muslims wish to turn back the clock and return to the primitive times. It is argued here that it is a gross misperception and reflects deep-rooted ethno-centrism of the Western scholars. Our argument is that Islamic revivalism is both a reaction against Liberal and Marxist internationalisms which are seen as the two imperialist ideologies of the West as well as expressions of the Western identity; that Islam is a world-view which can be properly understood on its own terms.

Each of these three traditions - Liberalism, Marxism and Islam - has a distinctive world-view rooted in certain metaphysical assumptions and an explicit international claim according to which it seeks to shape or re-shape the world. Liberalism is the dominant hegemonic ideology of the West. Marxism, which itself is a Western ideology, had posed up until recently a formidable challenge to the dominance of Liberalism in the post - World War II. As for

Islam, it has re-emerged as potentially the most significant challenge to both the ideologies of the West. The Table I (see p.8) summarizes the core categories of the three traditions.

These three traditions - Liberalism, Marxism and Islam - to use Kuhn's phrase, constitute "paradigms" with their own core beliefs. The term "paradigm" is used here for "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a community".¹¹ The above table of the core categories illustrate alternative world - views of different traditions. Cultural, political and economic criteria of the three traditions sharply differ from each other.


Liberalism considers nationalism a natural doctrine and seeks to achieve world unity through the prism of nation-states. Its proponents believe that humanity is naturally divided on the basis of race, language and colour, and the nation-states must get together to conquer the forces of nature. In political terms, the individual is the pivot of its philosophy, and liberal democracy is the operational form through which individuals express their preferences. The concept of community does not enter the purview of Liberalism. In economic terms, growth and modernization are key concerns of the liberal philosophy. It is more concerned with increasing the size of the cake than distributing it fairly and equitably.

Marxism cherishes classless world society as the ultimate goal. It emphasizes class struggle as natural and inevitable. It recognizes ethnic groups as nations, and believes in socialist democracy as opposed to the bourgeois democracy cherished by

TABLE I

CORE CATEGORIES OF THREE TRADITIONS

	LIBERALISM	MARXISM	ISLAM
Cultural	Nationalism/ Internationalism	Classless Society	Ummah
Political	Liberal Democracy	Multi-National Socialist Democracy	Shūrā
Economic	Growth/ Modernization	Elimination of Exploitation	Justice

Diagram
Showing

Nationalism and Internationalism in Three Traditions

Liberalism. It views the absence of exploitation as its chief criterion in judging its economic performance. In this tradition, the interests of the community are considered to have precedence over the interests of the individual.

As for Islam, it considers believers to belong to one global community, the *ummah*. The distinctions of race, language and colour, according to the Islamic view, are accidental and for facility of reference only. It recognizes *shūrā* (mutual consultation) in the community as the hall-mark of its political system but sovereignty belongs to Allah rather than to the king, or the dictator, or even the people. Hence, the *ummah's* freedom to make its decisions is circumscribed by the set of principles laid down in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet (peace be upon him). Justice is the key criterion for the society's socio-economic life. In the Islamic society an attempt is made to strike a balance between the role of the individual and the community. It is unlike Liberalism which pays almost sole attention to the individual, and also unlike Marxism which claims to focus its attention on the community.

These traditions espouse alternative views of state, society and international relations. They significantly differ from each other on fundamental assumptions. Is it possible to have a dialogue across these diverse cultural traditions? In our view, it is possible to understand each other better were we to understand these traditions from within and through their main spokesmen. It is only in the hermeneutic sense that we can really understand these traditions. Although there is a tendency in the West to consider its own tradition alone as rational and scientific and denigrate other traditions as mere propaganda, religious obscurantism or superstition, yet a

contribution may be made towards the beginning of a genuine and meaningful dialogue across different cultures. With this end in view, we have attempted to survey the representative literature in each of these traditions, primarily focusing on the twentieth century writers. The literature is categorized under three headings: (a) Traditional Writers, (b) Modernization Theorists, and (c) Post-Modern Theorists.

Our focusing on these three traditions does not imply our denial of the existence of other traditions, or of their importance. The choice depends on this author's academic interests, and the fact that his familiarity is to a large extent limited to these three traditions. It is possible to explore the world-views of other traditions such as the Hindu, Confucian and Shinto, as well as the several African and Latin American traditions. However, any attempt to embark on such an ambitious project has not been made for fear of it becoming amorphous and superficial.¹²

ONE

Liberalism

The Western liberal tradition faced the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism and sought to resolve the inherent tensions between the two in favour of internationalism primarily through the prism of nation-state. Nationalism was regarded as a natural doctrine, a self-reproducing systemic phenomenon and the world was seen heading midway between limited nationalism and an internationalism based on shared necessities. In order to understand the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism in the liberal tradition, we shall first undertake a study of four traditional writers: A. J. Toynbee, E. H. Carr, Hans Kohn, and Carleton Hayes. After summarizing their views, we shall identify their common findings.

Toynbee

Toynbee is an internationalist *par excellence* in the Western communitarian tradition. He dismisses the nation-state as an inadequate unit of analysis and considers civilization as the appropriate focus of inquiry. He also considers the 'unity of the world' thesis as a 'misconception' into which modern Western historians have been led by the influence of their social environment. He perceptively observes:

The misleading feature is the fact that, in modern times, our own Western civilization has cast the net of its economic system all around the world, and this economic unification has been followed by a political unification on the same basis which has gone almost as far ... that all the states of the contemporary world form part of a single political system of Western origin ... while the economic and political maps have now been westernized, the cultural map remains substantially what it was before our Western society started on its career of economic and political conquest.¹

To him, the principal theme of the twentieth century history is disintegration. Disintegration starts when a creative minority loses its creativity and starts relying on force. The surrounding uncreative majority which was charmed before is now repelled. The revolt by internal and external proletariat hastens the process of disintegration. By 'internal proletariat' he means the manpower of ten disintegrating civilizations which has been conscripted into the Western system during the last four hundred years. External proletariat are the 'barbarians' outside the pale of civilization, though external proletariats have become insignificant with the global spread of the Western civilization. He sees 'unmistakable signs' of disintegration in the Western civilization. One manifestation of the revolt by the internal proletariat of the Western civilization is the emergence of ideologies of Nationalism, Fascism and Communism.

Toynbee considers nationalism a negative force which has appeared as a result of the rise of new social forces under the impact of democracy and industrialism in the context of parochial state. The Western society was in a happier posture in the 'pre-nationalist

age' of the eighteenth century but then the world economic and political order was subverted by political and economic nationalism. He considers the internecine warfare aroused by nationalism as a 'time of troubles' for the Western civilization. He notes:

Mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian era, the Western society was manifestly given over to the worship of a number of idols; but among these one stood out above the rest, namely the worship of the parochial state The restraining influence of a universal church had been removed. The impact of democracy in the form of nationalism, coupled in many cases with some new angled ideology, had made the warfare more bitter, and impetus given by industrialism and technology had provided the combatants with increasingly destructive weapons.²

Another conspicuous mark of disintegration is a phenomenon in the last stage when a disintegrating civilization purchases a reprieve by submitting to a forcible political unification in a universal state. He reckons the rise of Fascism and Hitler's attempt to unify the world among such attempts. He regards Communism as an internal threat to the Western civilization. He observes:

... even if one day the Communist dispensation were to fulfil the Russian Communists' hopes by spreading all over the face of the planet, a world wide triumph of Communism would not mean triumph of an alien culture, since Communism, unlike Islam, is itself derived from a Western source, being a reaction from and a criticism of the Western Capitalism that it combats.³

Toynbee notes Communism's transition from 'universal religion' to 'national-statist' variety with satisfaction. He warns

that despite the ascendancy of the West, the traditional cultures of other civilizations continue to exist:

In the struggle for existence, the West has driven its contemporaries to the wall and entangled them in the meshes of its economic and political ascendancy, but it has not yet disarmed them of their distinctive cultures. Hard pressed though they are, they can still call their souls their own.⁴

Toynbee specifically notes the possibility of Islamic resurgence in the future:

As for the Islamic society, we may perhaps discern an ideological premonition of a universal state in the Pan-Islamic movement.⁵

He warns the Western historians against three false ideas: (a) ego-centrism, (b) the illusion of the unchanging East, and (c) the illusion of progress as a movement that proceeds in a straight line.

E.H. Carr

Carr recognizes that internationalism has usually been the creed of the dominant nation at global level, as the cry of nationalism has been the ideology of the dominant ethnic group in the domestic context.⁶ He notes that communitarian feeling both at the international and national levels may easily degenerate into imperialism if the principal groups lose sight of the values and start relying on pure force.

Carr identifies the following three periods in the modern evolution of nationalism and its impact on the changing character of international relations.⁷

The first period, in his view, consists of the pre-French revolution era. This is the period when the nations tended to be identified with their sovereigns. International relations during this period were, therefore, essentially the relations between the sovereigns of different lands. Modern international law was born in this phase. It was the most international period in the contemporary era when "civilians could pass to and fro and transact their business freely while their respective sovereigns were at war". Mercantilist economy was primarily meant to augment the power of the state and the nobility.

The second period, in Carr's opinion, extends from the French revolution to 1914. "Nation" in this period was identified with the 'middle classes' and international relations were characterized by a delicate balance between the forces of nationalism and internationalism. Nationalism did not become a destructive force for international relations for two reasons: (1) the middle classes remained united because of their fear of the revolution from below, and (2) the *laissez-faire* economic system became truly international under the British leadership because of the worldwide expansion of capitalism.

The third period, which extends from 1914 to 1945, is characterized by the catastrophic growth of nationalism and the bankruptcy of internationalism. Carr attributes the growth of nationalism to three causes: (1) the rise of new social strata to

effective national membership; (2) the replacement of a single world economy by multiple national economies; and (3) an increase in the number of nations. He notes that the essence of the contemporary crisis is the lack of compromise between the forces of nationalism and internationalism. The uneasy balance that had come to be established, however, broke down in 1914.

Carr is cautiously optimistic about the prospects for internationalism in the contemporary period because of two reasons: (1) the horrors of the two world wars, and (2) the multi-national character of the two superpowers, USA and USSR.

Hans Kohn

Unlike the above two writers who approach the question of nationalism from an international angle, Hans Kohn and Carleton Hayes focus on nationalism first and internationalism later. The ideas of these two writers were most important in influencing the views of the later writers on nationalism.

Hans Kohn, "a prophet of liberal rationalism and world community", has been the most influential writer in shaping the ideas of most of the contemporary theorists of nationalism in the liberal tradition.⁸ His categories are uncritically employed by the present-day liberal writers on nationalism. He defines nationalism as a "state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative energy and of economic well being".⁹

Hans Kohn's major argument pervading all through his writings is that enlightened nationalism and liberalism are compatible and that such a nationalism could promote individual liberty and world unity. In his early writings, Kohn distinguished between cultural nationalism and political nationalism. He thought that cultural nationalism was a progressive force and was the best means to minimize the tension between the individual and the community. Kohn considered political nationalism to be a principle of the nineteenth century for ordering the affairs of men, but it need not govern the twentieth. He was optimistic that cultural nationalism would replace political nationalism. He believed that nationalism was compatible with internationalism. He also believed that the very growth of nationalism all over the world, with its awakening of the masses to participation in political and cultural life, had prepared the way for closer cultural contacts among all the civilizations of mankind, which would simultaneously separate and unite them. He observed:

With the transformation of social and economic life, with the growing interdependence of all nationalities on a shrinking earth, with a new direction to education, the circumference may widen to include supranational areas of common interest and common sympathy.¹⁰

He was an ardent believer in the eventual unity which he thought would come about in the form of a vertical organization of humanity culturally divided into separate units.

Kohn justified imperialism as the middle link in a chain that began with European nationalism and ended with its Asian counterpart. Nationalism united the members of the European

nations into political states and then impelled each state to prove its greatness by extending its political and economic domination to foreign peoples. This imperialism in turn inflamed the nationalism of the oppressed people.

Kohn's earlier distinction between cultural and political nationalism developed into good political nationalism versus bad political nationalism in his later writings. Good political nationalism such as the English, Dutch, and French emphasized individual freedom and citizenship rights and internationalism, while bad political nationalism such as that of the East European variety was narrow, collectivist and exclusivist. He outlined the following characteristics of Western and Eastern nationalism (See Table II, p.21).

Kohn condemned Fascism, Nazism, Pan-Slavism, and Pan-Asianism as they had deviated from the liberal values of the West. In his earlier writings, Kohn praised the supra-national nationality policy of the Soviet Union as the true embodiment of the values of Western Enlightenment, but after the second world war, he became extremely critical of the Soviet Union.¹¹

Carleton Hayes

Carleton Hayes distinguishes between patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism is a natural sentiment but nationalism is an artificial construct, an ideology which initially came to dominate Western Europe and later became a major 'European export' to the 'constantly broadening market' of the world. He defines nationalism as follows: "The cultural bases of nationality are a common language and common historical traditions. When these, by some process of

TABLE II

WESTERN AND EASTERN NATIONALISM

WESTERN NATIONALISM	EASTERN NATIONALISM
1. arose in areas with a strong middle class;	arose in areas with a weak middle class;
2. was based intellectually on the eighteenth-century Enlightenment; emphasized rationality and individual liberty as the bases of progress;	was a reaction against Enlightenment; stressed the irrational (hence emphasis on Romanticism) and the group or collective unit as the basis for progress;
3. emphasized the future; was "forward-looking";	emphasized a supposedly heroic and often mythical past;
4. was an indigenous or original development;	was "derived" from the West;
5. tended to limit state power;	tended to "glorify" power;
6. aimed at world unity (universal messianism).	was narrow and exclusivist (national messianism).

(Ken Wolf, "Hans Kohn's Liberal Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 4 (October-December 1976)

education, become the objects of popular emotional patriotism, the result is nationalism.¹²

Why did nationalism arise in Europe? Hayes lists three causes. First of these is the religious void in Europe in which nationalism became the substitute for religion, or itself because a new 'religion'. He notes:

... it is an arresting fact that the era of Enlightenment which witnessed among the classes the growth of scepticism about Christianity witnessed also a substitute exaltation -- a sanctification as it were -- of the secular state, especially of the national state.¹³

Secondly, the socio-economic changes which took place under the impact of industrial revolution and democracy paved the way for the rise of nationalism. Hayes particularly emphasizes two such changes: (1) the dislocation of the masses, and (2) the emergence of the middle class with its vested interest in the control and direction of the national government. The middle class found the ideology of nationalism useful for its purposes. Thirdly, nationalism also received encouragement from socializing agencies and institutions which propagated the nationalist ethos under a 'pseudo-scientific' garb and educated the masses in terms of new symbols.

Hayes traces in fascinating detail how nationalism evolved originally from an originally pristine doctrine (humanitarian nationalism) which emphasized liberty, equality and fraternity, into national imperialism from 1874 onward.¹⁴ He stresses the fact that nationalism turned into imperialism in the last stage both internally and abroad. He notes:

... despite the progress made since the French revolution in redrawing the map of Europe along lines of nationality and in creating unified national states, no European state as yet embraced or was confined to, a single nationality National self-determination gave way to determination by superior peoples. Nationalism became imperialistic not only overseas but also within Europe (and America).¹⁵

Examining the different varieties of nationalism -- Humanitarian, Jacobin, Traditional, Liberal and Integral -- Hayes notes that none of these different varieties of nationalism (except the integral one) was opposed to internationalism in theory, but in practice each one of them, gradually and imperceptibly, was transformed into imperialism. He notes the catastrophic consequences of the development of nationalism:

...international rivalries and wars have become progressively more frequent, more general and more destructive, in measure as nationalism has evolved from its humanitarian prototype, through Jacobin, traditionalist and liberal phases, into its ... integral form.¹⁶

Toynbee, Carr and Hayes note the negative consequences of nationalism for international relations, inevitably leading to hatred for others, to rivalries and wars. These writers support internationalism based on the universal values of their civilization, such as liberty and social justice, irrespective of nationality. While Toynbee and Carr expect internationalism to prevail after the two world wars, Hayes does not share their optimism. He believes that as long as there are no socializing institutions devoted to the cause of internationalism, the negative force of nationalism can not be discounted. All the three writers treat different varieties of nationalism on a

single continuum. Transformation of nationalism from its humanitarian to its fascist and imperialist types appears to them as a logical consequence rooted within the doctrine of nationalism itself. Hayes notes that it is a 'linear projection' from one type to another.

Kohn's view is different and had the most influence on the views of later writers about nationalism. Himself an ardent liberal nationalist throughout his life, he believed in the inherent goodness of the doctrine of nationalism. His distinctions between political versus the cultural, good nationalism versus bad nationalism, liberal versus illiberal creeds, are very important and in fact dominate much of the later literature on nationalism. Despite the world wars, Kohn passionately believes that the road to internationalism lies through liberal nationalism.

Modernization Theorists

In the post - second world war period, the literature on international relations theories (with a few exceptions) tends, on the whole, to bypass the issue of nationalism in favour of internationalism. We shall briefly review the development of liberal internationalist literature in three phases: (1) integration theorists, (2) interdependence theorists, and (3) regimes theorists.

Two important scholars whose work inspired a research programme on the formation of larger political communities in the early 1950s and 1960s were Karl W. Deutsch and Ernst B. Haas.¹⁷

Deutsch regards political communities "as social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for

enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance". Since these may not be able regularly to resolve their internal conflicts without recourse to large scale physical force, special emphasis is placed on "security communities", where this is reliably possible. Of special interest was the historical discovery in the North Atlantic area of "pluralistic security communities" whose members retain "the legal independence of separate governments". Deutsch believed that the process of modernization would eventually lead to the global integration of the world. He predicted:

The whole thrust of the technological development of our time pushes beyond wars and beyond the economic fences of nation-states. It seems to push towards a pluralistic world of limited international law, limited, but growing international cooperation and regional pluralistic security communities.¹⁸

Haas defines integration "as the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new larger centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states".¹⁹ Focusing upon the European Economic Community, he believes that the established nation-state is in 'full retreat' and integration is a 'historical fact' in Europe. The orientation of his research is pragmatic. In Haas' own words, "the art of manipulating integration consists in isolating functional areas ... and in capitalizing upon those non-political aims which very soon spill over into the realm of politics The urban industrial pluralistic environment is optimal for this purpose, but not unique". It is not possible to review all the authors on integration. However, Table III (see p.26) gives a brief outline of

TABLE III

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS OF INTEGRATION:
THREE CHARACTERIZATIONS

DEUTSCH ET AL. (1957)	HAAS- SCHMITTER (1964)	NYE (1971)
Consistent: 1. Compatibility of major values;	Elite complementarity;	Elite value complementarity;
2. Mutual responsiveness;	Adaptability of governments;	Capability of member states to adapt and respond;
Consistent, but different emphasis: 3. Broadening of elites;	Pluralism;	Pluralism (modern associational groups);
Inconsistent: 4. Development of strong core area;	Similarity in size and power;	Symmetry or economic equality of units.
Not emphasized by all the three sources: 5. Wide range of transactions;	High rate of previous transactions.	-----
6. Greater mobility of persons;	-----	-----
7. Unbroken links of social communication;	-----	-----
8. Distinctive way of life;	-----	-----
9. Superior economic growth.	-----	-----

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "International Interdependence and Integration" in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, (eds.), *International Politics: Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 8, (Reading, MA: Addison - Wesley, 1975), p. 379.

the structural conditions of integration emphasized by the major writers.

As European integration reached a plateau by the early seventies, it was noticed that the expectation of successfully duplicating the experience of Western European Market in the rest of the world did not come true with the result that "interdependence" became a focus of much American scholarship with a community-building orientation.²⁰ Attacking the adequacy of the Hobbesian-realist image of international relations, Keohane and Nye argued that even during the most bitter years of East-West conflict, interstate relations in Western Europe were characterized by unprecedented cooperation, which rapidly went beyond wary diplomatic coexistence -- beyond, that is, the traditional 'state of war'.

More recently, as the American world hegemony - despite some temporary signs to the contrary - shows symptoms of decline, regimes literature has come to occupy the attention of scholars. International regimes are defined as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area".²¹ Like the earlier work on different functional contexts, the emphasis on distinctive patterns in separate issue areas responds to the methodological injunctions of pluralistic domestic power theorists. The most common proposition is that hegemonic distribution of power leads to stable open economic regimes because it is in the interest of a hegemonic state to pursue such policy and because the hegemony has the resources to provide the collective goods needed to make such a system function effectively.²² Pluralism, behavioral science, liberal economics have

almost nostalgically defined a weaker form of international cooperation for intensive investigation: the "regime".

There are three principal weaknesses of the relevant literature on the question concerned. Given an inbuilt bias towards integration, the conditions militating against integration received little or no attention. In a thoughtful critique of the literature, K.J. Holsti writes:

... the fact of increasing interconnectedness is undoubtedly correct. Its consequences remain problematical, however. Increased transaction flows can lead to dependency, exploitation, conflict and violence as well as to more collaboration and mutual knowledge

Nationalist-policies, secession and international fragmentation and/or disintegration are likely to occur exactly in situations typified by asymmetrical patterns of sensitivity and vulnerability, unequal exchange, unidirectional flows and attempts by the strong to penetrate the political, economic and cultural life of the weak.²³

The primary concentration of the literature is on the Western world. Despite its global pretention, its theoretical categories remain ethno-centric. It does not take into account integrative and disintegrative experience either of the socialist countries or of the developing countries because of its conceptual and methodological bias.

Finally, little or no attention was paid to the phenomenon of nationalism itself. It was taken for granted that the nation-state was a given fact, an unproblematic entity. However, the liberal edifice of internationalism began to crumble when the nation-state

itself was challenged by the nationalist movements in all the three worlds.

However, two writers must be singled out for their concern with the question of nationalism - K. W. Deutsch and Ernest Gellner.

K.W. Deutsch

Karl Deutsch believes that both society and community are developed by social learning and that a community consists of people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other beyond the mere interchange of goods and services. He defines nationality as follows:

In the political and social struggles of the modern age, nationality, then, means an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centres and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse both indirectly from link to link and directly with the centre.²⁴

Deutsch argues that modernization and nationalism go hand in hand. The concept of social mobilization is central to his understanding of nationalism. Social mobilization is the process by which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization. Nationalism, then, fulfils an emotional need of the individual, though, he allows that 'militarism' or 'another ideology' may as well serve the same function.²⁵ The major thrust of his theory is towards integration, though he admits the possibility of secession as well. He writes:

If assimilation stays ahead of mobilization or keeps abreast of it, the government is likely to remain stable, and eventually everybody will be integrated into one people ... where mobilization is fast and assimilation is slow, the opposite happens. More and more highly mobilized and disgruntled people are held at an arm's length from the politics and culture of their state, and they easily become alienated from the government, the state, and even the country to which they thus far had belonged.²⁶

Deutsch's position, however, came under sharp attack, as we shall see later.

Ernest Gellner

Gellner defines nationalism as primarily "a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent". "National sentiment is the feeling of the anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment". By 'nation' he means the following:

1. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.
2. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation.²⁷

Mankind, in his view, has passed through three stages: the pre-agrarian, the agrarian, and the industrial. In the agrarian

age, there is no single overriding cultural identity. Everything in it militates against the definition of political units in terms of cultural boundaries. Political units in the stage are primarily of two kinds: local self-governing communities and large empires. Nationalism is the product of the third stage, the industrial age. It is rooted in a certain kind of division of labour characteristic of this age. Industrialization engenders a mobile and culturally homogeneous society. It is the objective need for homogeneity which is reflected in nationalism.

Industrial society also has egalitarian expectations such as had generally been lacking in the previous stable, stratified, dogmatic, and absolutist agrarian society. At the same time in its early stages, industrial society also engenders very sharp, painful and conspicuous inequality because early industrialism means population explosion, rapid urbanisation, labour migration, and also economic and political penetration of previously more or less inward turned communities by global economy and centralizing polity. Those less advantageously placed in that period tend to be not only relatively but also absolutely miserable. In such a situation latent political tension is acute, and that tension becomes actual if good symbols can be seized. Characteristically, it may seize on language, or genetically transmitted traits (racism) or on culture alone. Some parts of the pre-existent cultures are used in the process generally in a transformed shape. Gellner sees this process at the global level:

As the tidal wave of modernization sweeps the world, it makes sure that almost every one, at the same time or other, has cause to feel unjustly treated, and that he can identify the culprits as being of another nation. If he can identify

enough of the victims as being of the same nation as himself, a nationalism is born. If it succeeds and not all of them can, a nation is born.²⁸

As regards the future, Gellner believes that future lies between less virulent forms of nationalism and an internationalism based on shared necessities.

There are many similarities in Deutsch and Gellner's arguments: the central role of modernization, mass dislocations and the need for identity, the importance of communication and general similarities of conclusions. However, Gellner insists on the unevenness of the processes of modernization and the variety of possible transitions to industrial modernity. He allows more room for a variety of cultural symbols besides language which is stressed more by Deutsch. His treatment of religious symbols is markedly different from any of the modernization theorists. For example, he considers Islam as an indigenous "literacy-sustained tradition" and noting its inherent flexibility and potential fitness with the modernization process, he remarks:

Under modern conditions, its capacity to be a more abstract faith, presiding over an anonymous community of equal believers could reassert itself.²⁹

Post Modernization Theorists

In the early seventies, modernization paradigm came under general attack from two directions. The Dependencia school, inspired by the Marxist-dialectical tradition, uncovered the structures of neo-colonialism and stressed the inadequacy of nation-state as an

appropriate unit of analysis, thus challenging the foundation of liberal international literature. Another attack came from within the liberal tradition. Walker Connor led the attack by publishing his seminal article "Nation-Building or Nation Destroying" in *World Politics*, and stressed the global reality of the rise of ethno-nationalism.³⁰ William J. Foltz, in a thoughtful review of the literature observes:

The nation-state as a unit of analysis has been attacked from both above and below. From above, the flood of writings of the various 'dependency theory' and structural imperialism schools have sought and sometimes succeeded, in showing that effective 'centre' may not lie anywhere within a poor state's national boundaries, that economic, social and political change depends on decisions and forces located outside The attack from below has been less extensive, but no less intense. This approach has looked at sub-national units as the prime political reality and analyzed national politics a little more than a fight for hegemony of the winning over the losing groups.³¹

Because of our focus on the issue of nationalism, it is the 'attack from below' which is of concern to us here. In this connection we shall take note of two writers, Walker Connor and A.D. Smith.

Walker Connor

Connor criticizes Deutsch's thrust on integration and his discounting of the tendencies of disintegration. He writes:

On the one hand, this work contains a few passing acknowledgements that increasing contacts between culturally

diverse people might increase antagonisms. On the other hand, there are several passages that might lead the reader to conclude that Deutsch was convinced that modernization, in the form of increases in urbanization, industrialization, schooling, communication, and transportation facilities, etc., would lead to assimilation.³²

Connor argues that a preponderant number of states are multi-ethnic. Less than ten percent of all states, in his sample, would qualify as essentially homogeneous. Citing a number of examples from all the three worlds, he convincingly argues that "ethnic consciousness has been definitely increasing, not decreasing, in recent years".

Connor distinguishes between 'nation' and 'state' and emphasizes that each evoked a different kind of loyalty. 'Nation', in his view, must be understood in a very subjective sense. It is the "self-view of one's group" rather than a set of tangible characteristics, that is of essence in determining the existence or non-existence of a nation. He notes:

... ethnic strife is too often superficially discerned as principally predicated upon language, religion, custom, economic inequity, or some other tangible element. But what is fundamentally involved in such a conflict is that divergence of basic identity which manifests itself in the "us-them" syndrome. And the ultimate answer to the question of whether a person is one of us, or one of them, seldom hinges on adherence to overt aspects of culture.³³

A.D. Smith

Smith develops an elaborate critique of Gellner's theory. He appreciates the theory's positive points: its linkage between the unevenness of the processes of modernization and variety of possible transitions to industrial modernity, a synthesis between literacy culture and industrial competition and a balance between the subjective and objective factors. But he also makes the following critical points: (1) Gellner's theory does not take into account pre-industrial national movements which were often successful in mobilizing masses for their causes. (2) Contrary to what the theory implies, the social composition of the nationalist movements has often been very diverse and not confined to the industrial workers only. (3) There is a sort of economic determinism in the theory which leads us to believe that certain kinds of structure necessarily lead to certain kinds of consequence. As a result, it is assumed that nationalism is a transitional phenomenon, which will come to an end when modernization is completed. Pointing to the contemporary resurgence of nationalism in Europe and America, he argues that there is no strong and necessary connection between the course of nationalism and the trajectory of industrialization. His basic argument is that nationalism is here to stay, probably, for ever.

The fact is that we have arrived at a point where nationalism appears to be a self-reproducing phenomenon, given the persistence of the world state-system in any form. Hence the cosmopolitan hopes for an early withering away of nationalism are doomed to disappointment, for they are based on a failure to grasp the importance today of the conjuncture of ethnic sentiments, secular

ideals and the changing elements of modernization and the social concomitant of modernization.³⁴

How does Smith arrive at this view? We shall summarize his position by concentrating on three questions: What is nationalism? Why has it continued to be so powerful? And why will it continue to stay?

Smith thinks that too great an emphasis on the modernizing potential of nationalism overlooks the importance of its ethnic roots in the past. He notes:

... the study of nationalism needs to be reoriented to take account not only of the new forces associated with the French and industrial revolutions, but also of the retention of older ties and sentiments often long antedating the modern era.³⁵

Smith defines nationalism as "an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation".³⁶ He differentiates between ethno-centric nationalism and poly-centric nationalism, the former being of a primitive variety and the latter being a modern one. He notes three components of poly-centric nationalism: autonomy, individuality and pluralism.

Fundamentally, nationalism fuses three ideals: collective self-determination of the people, the expression of national character and individuality, and finally, the vertical division

of the world into unique nations, each contributing its special genius to the common fund of humanity.³⁷

Smith distinguishes nationalism from fascism, racism, populism and imperialism. Fascism is different because it has different objectives and a different social base, therefore, a 'unique' phenomenon of inter-war years. Imperialism, racism and populism are derogation, even a contradiction of the main tenets of nationalism.³⁸

Why has nationalism continued to be so powerful? Smith offers four reasons:³⁹ (1) the failure of the modern state to contain and minimize the ethnic revival, (2) the counter-productive pressure of the world state-system on the state elite to homogenize and integrate, (3) the continuing effects of nationalist ideals and movements, and (4) the revolt by the intelligentsia from peripheral areas against the inequitable systems.

Why will nationalism continue to stay? Smith's answer is:

The real point is that the persistence of nationalism, even after its initial political demands have been met and even after modernization is attained, is a function of the international system itself. Nationalism may initially have helped to create that system; now it is in turn maintained by that system, much as the industrial machine now maintains the capitalism that did so much to promote industrialism.⁴⁰

Evaluation

Among the traditional liberal writers, there existed two interpretations about the possible effects of nationalism on international relations: one primarily emphasized integration and the other stressed disintegration. Hans Kohn considered nationalism a positive force which would bring greater participation of the people and would eventually lead to a new kind of integration of the world primarily based on the liberal values of the West. He cherished the values of the Enlightenment and believed that they would provide the basis for world unity.

Other traditional writers -- Toynbee, Carr, and Hayes -- saw the disintegration of the civilization as the central tendency and held nationalism and its variations responsible for it. To them, nationalism was born as a result of the religious void and the rise of democracy and industrialism. They saw the pivotal role of the middle classes in shaping the 19th and 20th century world order. They treated nationalism, fascism, and imperialism on the same continuum, one imperceptibly shading into the other with increasing mass participation in politics. They were particularly concerned about the consequences of nationalism for international relations which had led to hatred for others, international rivalries, and two world wars. Their value premises were clear. They saw that if the groups lost sight of their values and started relying on pure force, the communitarian feeling both at the international as well as national levels could degenerate into imperialism.

Modernization theorists in the 1950s and 1960s saw integration as the basic tendency. They concentrated on

internationalism which they thought was around the corner and largely neglected the study of nationalism which they thought was a settled matter. Western Europe was the model but the theories were claimed to be universally applicable. They were professedly scientific and value-neutral. Thirty years of research brought home to the scholars that the world which they were studying did not conform to their theories. And despite scientific pretensions, their outlook was primarily Euro-centric. Their elaborate theoretical edifice, both conceptual and methodological, was inevitably biased and captured only one facet of the reality. They studied internationalism, integration, and interdependence, but showed little interest in nationalism, disintegration and dependence. However, a more sociologically grounded work like Karl Deutsch's on nationalism has stood the test of time. His insights into both the patterns of integration and secession continue to be relevant. More importantly, his work inspired a generation of post-modernization scholars whose work virtually amounts to a paradigm shift.

Among the post-modernization theorists, Walker Connor's exemplary work catalyzed the beginning of a new field of comparative ethnicity studies.⁴¹ The primary theme of this literature was disintegration. The importance of Walker Connor's work lies in the fact that he brought a wholly different way of looking at international politics. His emphasis on ethnic groups brought into light the issue of multiple loyalties into sharp focus. An individual could hold several loyalties and loyalty to the nation-state was only one of them. The crucial question was: which of the identities gets politicized and under which circumstances? Different schools explored different avenues. Primordialists emphasized cultural

factors,⁴² instrumentalists stressed modernization, group competition, and an increasing ethnic consciousness.⁴³

It must be stressed, however, that under the term 'ethnic' these writers lumped together a number of loyalties ranging from racial to religious, under one heading. It is certainly to their credit that they brought into light the diversity of the world and the inadequacy of previous conceptual categories to capture the multifaceted aspects of reality, but they also tended to simplify the reality in their own way in a narrow technical cognitive sense.

A.D. Smith's work has been a brave attempt to give nationalism a good face. He provides some good conceptual tools, but his argument basically amounts to a justification of one variety of nationalism, i.e., liberal nationalism. His sharp distinction between nationalism, fascism and imperialism is not only unconvincing but also ahistorical. His emphasis on differentiating nationalism from its other 'close relatives' such as fascism, racism and imperialism, almost takes a moralistic overtone and primarily hinges on his sharp division between good nationalism and bad nationalism.⁴⁴ We have already demonstrated in the discussion of traditional writers how they considered different varieties of nationalism on the same continuum, and each variety logically and inevitably shading into the other. His argument regarding the continuing vitality of nationalism is also a partial truth and seems to be more a defense of *status quo* than anything else. It is static and refuses the possibility of a continuously changing and dynamic reality.

TWO

Marxism

The Marxist tradition is explicitly internationalist in its orientation. It tries to understand the phenomena of nationalism with a view to overcome its challenge to the emerging proletarian internationalism envisioned by its founders. We shall embark on our inquiry regarding the Marxist tradition by studying, first of all, the traditional writers of this school - Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. This is natural since the role of these two thinkers in the shaping of the Marxist school of thought was a foundational one.

Traditional Writers: Marx and Engels

It must be stressed at the outset that Marx and Engels did not have a coherent and well articulated theory on nationalism, because that was not their primary concern. They were internationalist in their outlook. Their original position is outlined in the *Communist Manifesto*. They saw capitalism creating "a universal interdependence of nations". They observed:

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.¹

They envisioned a proletarian international society emerging out of this universalization of capitalism. Their utopia consisted of a classless and post-national society free of exploitation. Eventual integration was their primary theme.

They viewed nationalism as the ideology of the capitalist class, part of the superstructure, but a historically necessary prerequisite for the establishment of the capitalist order. It served the functional purpose of integrating various localities under one nation at one particular historical stage.² In their view, the correlation of state and nation had its origins in the fifteenth century during the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The state institutionalized the bourgeois power, while nationality functioned as the ideological core around which the bourgeoisie both consolidated its domestic power over the working class and peasants and solidified a nation *vis-a-vis* other capitalist nations. However, they saw the movement of history from the capitalistic national state towards an international socialist community. Their advice to the workers was:

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.... Working men of the world, unite.³

Marx and Engels did occasionally provide support to the nationalist movements, notably of Poland and Ireland, but this support was not contradictory to their basic position outlined above as they deemed it compatible with the international objectives of the communist movement.⁴ A nationalist movement could be progressive or revolutionary depending upon its character. Nationalism was considered as of an instrumental value in furthering the objective of creating a post-national socialist community.

Modernization Theorists:

Lenin

Lenin was a truly international communitarian in the socialist tradition. He refined and elaborated the original Marxist position in certain novel ways. He was convinced that eventually Marxism could not be reconciled with nationalism, be it even the "most just", "purest", and most refined type, because Marxism advanced internationalism, the amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity.⁵ In order to understand Lenin's position correctly we must see both the context of his writings as well as the two alternative theoretical positions advanced within the socialist tradition in opposition to him. One position was represented by the national socialists: Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, and the other was advocated by the Marxist inter-nationalists: Rosa Luxemburg, Nikolai Bukharin, Karl Radek, Grigori Piatakov, and Trotsky.

Lenin began taking serious interest in the national question in 1913. The nationality question had been placed in the forefront because of a tense international situation on the eve of World War I.⁶ More important was the fact that nationalism had emerged as

the most serious rival ideology to socialism, affecting the ranks of the socialist parties and their potential constituency, the proletariat. Lenin observed:

... in the epoch of imperialism owing to objective causes, the proletariat has been split into two internationalist camps, one of which has been corrupted by the crumbs that fall from the table of the bourgeoisie of the dominant nations -- obtained among other things, from the double or triple exploitation of small nations -- while the other cannot liberate itself without liberating the small nations, without educating the masses in an anti-chauvinistic i.e. anti-annexationist, i.e. self-determinationist spirit.⁷

National Socialist Position

Karl Renner and Otto Bauer consider the nation as the enduring form of society. Their plan for national cultural autonomy subordinates class analysis to nation-state as the principal unit, thus reversing the original Marxist position in which class struggle constitutes the substance and nation-state merely a form, subject to change. Bauer wrote:

The construction of the great national states in the nineteenth century is only the precursor of an era in which the principle of nationality will be fully recognized.... Socialism leads necessarily to the realization of the principle of nationality The transformation of men by the socialist mode of production leads necessarily to the organization of humanity in national communities. The international division of labour leads necessarily to the unification of the national communities in a social structure of higher order. All nations will be united for the common domination of nature,

but the totality will be organized in national communities which will be encouraged to develop autonomously and to enjoy fully their national culture⁸

In essence, their plan does not differ very much from the liberal nationalists of the Western tradition who perceive nation-state as the natural unit and internationalism through the prism of nation-states.

Internationalist Position

Rosa Luxemburg, Bukharin, and others were internationalists in their approach. They regarded self-determination as a bourgeois phraseology. There was no such metaphysical right. Their position was: in the epoch of imperialism, the tendency is for large capitalist states to become larger. This tendency is in the nature of the case and cannot be fought piecemeal; the only solution is to abolish capitalism. The Bolsheviks should not advise the proletariat to spend its forces campaigning for national self-determination within the capitalist orbit; this would be utopian and create illusions. Rosa Luxemburg considered the slogan of national self-determination as a mask for bourgeois class rule:

... under the rule of capitalism there is no self-determination of people, that in a class society, each class of the nation strives to determine itself, in a different fashion; and that for the bourgeois classes, the standpoint of national freedom is fully subordinated to that of class rule.⁹

She thought nationalism was merely a cloak which, translated into foreign policy, covered imperialistic desires and rivalries.

This group thought that since socialism was generally opposed to oppression of any kind, therefore, there was no need of recourse to such bourgeois slogans such as the right of self-determination. The workers should directly struggle for socialist government, making it a common cause between the proletariat of different nationalities. Rosa Luxemburg sharply criticized Lenin's policy of self-determination as an "opportunistic policy", which might eventually lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.¹⁰

Lenin's Position

Lenin was critical of both the above positions. He believed that cultural national autonomy programme of Austrian socialists and Jewish Bundists undoubtedly contradicted the internationalism of the proletariat and was in accordance with the ideals of the nationalist petty bourgeoisie. He was categorical:

The slogan of national culture is a bourgeois .. fraud. Our slogan is: the international culture of democracy and of the world working class movement... the place of those who advocate the slogan of national culture is among the nationalist petty bourgeois not among the Marxists.¹¹

Similarly, Lenin blamed the Bundists as "the instrument of bourgeois nationalism among the workers". He also criticized Rosa Luxemburg and other internationalists for not understanding the significance of the right of self-determination, thereby unconsciously supporting a different kind of imperialism i.e. social imperialism.¹² By the right of self-determination, he meant the 'right of secession', in the absolute sense of the term.

Why have national movements emerged? Lenin's answer was:

Throughout the world, the period of final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked with national movements. The economic basis of these movements is the fact that in order to achieve complete victory for commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, must have politically united territories with a population speaking the same language, and all obstacles to the development of this language and to its consolidation in literature must be removed.¹³

He believed that nationalism was the universal characteristic of the early stage of capitalism and will disappear with the maturing of capitalism.

Developing capitalism knows two historical tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of the national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states. The second is the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the breakdown of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, sciences, etc.

Both tendencies are a universal law of capitalism. The former predominates in the beginning of its development, the latter characterizes a mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society.¹⁴

He was convinced that nationalism was a transitional phenomenon:

In the same way as mankind can arrive at the abolition of classes only through a transition period of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, so can mankind arrive at the inevitable fusion of nations only through a transition period of the complete emancipation of all oppressed nations i.e. their freedom to secede.¹⁵

Lenin thought that in every society the elements of democratic and socialist culture were present side by side with bourgeois culture. The socialists should support that democratic and socialist element in opposition to the bourgeois culture. One finds a distinct emphasis in his writing on the voluntary re-association of nations after the conditions of oppression are gone. He deemed Tsarist Russia as "the prison of the people"¹⁶ and was convinced that ethnic groups and nations will re-associate themselves under socialism in a voluntary way.

Lenin did not believe in an unqualified right of self-determination. The Communist movement, in his view, should decide case by case if supporting the right of self-determination would advance the international objective of the movement or not.

Lenin was particularly optimistic about the possibility of an alliance between the Soviet Union and the awakened national liberation movements of Asia and Africa. He wrote:

The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey and China, the Balkan Wars -- such is the chain of world events of our period in our orient. And only a blind man could fail to see in this chain of events the awakening of a whole series

of bourgeois democratic movements which strive to create nationally independent and nationally uniform states. It is precisely and solely because Russia and the neighbouring countries are passing through this period that we must have a clause in our programme on the right of nations to self-determination.¹⁷

There were pragmatic as well as ideological reasons underlying this approach. Lenin had in his mind the "two-stage" revolution thesis. In the first stage, the Communists would support the national bourgeois in their national liberation movements but would not merge their identity with them, and in the second stage, the Communists would themselves seize power.

Lenin was very sensitive to the questions of oppression, imperialism and injustice towards the non-Russian peoples within the Soviet Union. In his last years, he was greatly concerned over Stalin's policy towards the nationalities and specifically the possibility of the re-emergence of greater Russian nationalism developing a similar kind of imperialistic relationship as it had existed during the Tsarist era. Criticizing some episode of mishandling of Ukrainian people, he wrote to Stalin:

It would be unpardonable opportunism if we, on the eve of the debut of the East, just before its awakening, undermined our own authority with its peoples, even if only by the slightest crudity or injustice towards our own non-Russian nationalities.¹⁸

Stalin

Stalin defines 'nation' as "a historically constituted stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture."¹⁹

There are, however, two significant departures from Lenin's position. First, that Stalin devotes all of his attention to attacking the Austrian socialists and the Jewish Bundist party's programme of cultural autonomy, but does not attack the position of the internationalists as Lenin had done. Second, he distinguishes between three stages of integration: (a) socialism in one country; (b) dictatorship of the proletariat; and (c) world socialist community.

In attacking the national socialists' position he reiterates the familiar points:

1. The national socialists consider the nation an objective, given and fixed category, ignoring the fact that it is a historical category, a product of early capitalism, and is subject to change as the socio-economic conditions change.
2. They tend to forget that nationalism in its essence is always a bourgeois ideology and national movements are primarily for the benefit of the bourgeois class.
3. They substitute the principles of class struggle for the principles of nationality, thus breaking themselves from the Marxist-Leninist tradition.

4. They overlook the fact that in the period of mature capitalism, people of different nations begin to scatter as a result of migration, urbanization and industrialization. Old identities are replaced by new identities. With the sharpening of class struggle, national culture begins to split into two distinct cultures, the culture of the bourgeois and the culture of the proletariat.

He describes the following three stages of integration:

... the first stage, during which national oppression will be definitely abolished, we will witness the growth and efflorescence of the formerly oppressed nations, the elimination of mutual national distrust and the knitting and strengthening of international ties among nations.

Only in the second stage of the period of world dictatorship of the proletariat, as a single socialist world economy is built up in place of the capitalist world economy -- only in that stage will something in the nature of a common language begin to take shape; for only in that stage will the nations feel the need to have, in addition to their own national language, a common international language -- for convenience of economic, cultural, and political cooperation.

In the next stage ... when the world socialist economic system has become sufficiently consolidated and socialism has become part and parcel of the life of peoples, and when practice has convinced the nations of the superiority of a common language over national languages -- national differences and languages will begin to die away and make room for a world language common to all nations.²⁰

Mao Tse Tung

Reluctantly, Mao Tse Tung, followed the Soviet advice of granting the right of self-determination to the Chinese minorities. The Communist Party of China maintained contradictory positions on the nationality question, promising the right of self-determination to the minorities, and at the same time, invoking Han patriotism in the Han majority areas.²¹ However, the lip-service to the right of self-determination paid handsome dividend during the Long March, and the party was able to win over the support of the minorities. With increasing support among the dominant Han-majority and the prospects of coming into power, emphasis shifted towards Chinese nationalism. Stalin's policy towards the nationalities was favourably quoted by Mao.²² After the revolution in 1949, it was made clear at the official level that "any national movement which seeks separation from the Chinese People's Republic for independence will be considered reactionary."²³

Mao's policy appears to be more in tune with Stalin's thinking and less in harmony with the international communitarian ideals of Lenin. Chou En-Lai draws a comparison with the Soviet experience which illustrates the contrast quite well:

China finds itself in different historical circumstances The revolutionary situation developed differently from that in the Soviet Union. We did not win political power by staging uprisings in big cities or in the industrially developed areas first; instead, we established revolutionary base-areas mainly in the countryside and won liberation after 22 years of revolutionary wars. In these war years, the various nationalities in our country had come to establish

close ties The relations among ourselves and our relations with the outside world do not require us to adopt the policy as was followed by Russia at the time of October Revolution, which laid emphasis on national self-determination and at the same time allowed the secession of nationalities.²⁴

Post-Modernization Theorists

It is difficult to name any single theorist in the post-revolutionary Soviet Union because of subservience of theory to the state propaganda machine; however, it is possible to discern some trends in a very broad sweep.

In the post-World War II era, Soviet internationalism was translated into a two-camp doctrine, which conditioned the Soviet foreign policy until Stalin's death in 1953. The world was divided into two hostile camps: the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union, and the capitalist camp led by the United States. Little notice was taken of the independence of developing countries. Khrushchev replaced the two-camp doctrine by dividing the world into two zones: the zone of peace consisting of the Soviet Union, socialist countries and neutral countries, and the zone of war consisting of the capitalists and their allied countries, thereby providing the necessary flexibility and maturity to the Soviet foreign policy and developing a coherent policy towards Asia, Africa and Latin America. Brezhnev consolidated the gains of his predecessors. He enunciated the Brezhnev doctrine, declaring to the world that the Soviet Union would not tolerate any intrusion in its sphere of influence first confining the application of this doctrine to the Eastern Europe

and later on (after the military intervention in Afghanistan) in Asia as well.

As regards the nationality question, initially the Soviet leadership continued to maintain that they had solved it. They also banned ethnic categories from the Soviet census from 1920 to 1959. However, when these were reintroduced in the 1959 and 1970 censuses, the Soviets were surprised at the reassertion of ethnic identities from the Baltic to Central Asia and were concerned over the demographic differentials between the non-Russian and the Russian peoples.²⁵ Brezhnev himself admitted:

... the Soviet nations are now united more than ever ... this does not imply that all the problems of the relations between nationalities have been resolved. The dynamics of the development of a large multinational state like ours gives rise to many problems requiring the party's tactful attention.²⁶

Andropov reaffirmed this in even stronger terms in December 1982 on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the creation of the USSR:

[Soviet] successes in solving the nationalities question certainly do not mean that all the problems engendered by the very fact of the life and work of numerous nations and nationalities in the framework of a single state have disappeared. This is hardly possible as long as nations exist, as long as there are national distinctions. And they will exist for a long time, much longer than class distinctions.²⁷

Writers in the dialectical-marxist tradition in the West have recently begun taking interest in the issue of nationalism and internationalism. Three such writers will be studied here: Immanuel Wallerstein, Michael Hechter, and Tom Naim.

Immanuel Wallerstein

Wallerstein's basic argument is that both nationalism and internationalism represent politico-ideological responses to the structural conditions implicit in the capital accumulation process. In particular, they derive from the persistence of the structural antimony between the unity of the world economy and its division among multiple states. He argues:

Both nationalism and internationalism have resulted from the historical tendencies of capitalist development. They have served both to undergird the objectives of those who have power in this world system and to rally the forces of resistance to this system. Consequently, the sense of identity which has sustained these ideological currents has not been a primordial given; rather it has been the outcome of conscious pressures of political forces occupying particular roles and seeking specific objectives within the development of the world system.²⁸

Nationalism and Communism have basically been anti-systemic movements. But there has been an ambiguity on the part of anti-systemic forces. Anti-systemic forces have historically remained ambivalent with regard to the state or to their struggle against the inter-state system.

Wallerstein criticizes the Marxist literature for this ambivalence. He also notes that the early Bolshevik vision of world revolution succumbed to the demands of 'socialism in one country'. However, despite his criticism, he believes that Marx had narrowly conceived the time frame and eventually we would have moved to the socialist international community in the long run.

Michael Hechter

Hechter was perplexed by the persistence of nationalism in the industrial society.²⁹ Explaining the background to the emergence of Irish, Scottish, and Welsh nationalism, Hechter propounds his 'internal colonial' model. He claims that overseas colonial development "produces a cultural division of labour: a system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class lines. High status occupations tend to be reserved for those of metropolitan culture, with those of indigenous culture clustered at the bottom of the stratification system". Economic dependency of the periphery is reinforced by centre through juridical, political and military measures. Aggregate economic differences between the core and the periphery are causally linked to their cultural differences.

Contrary to the prediction of Marxist theorists of inevitable triumph of class over nationalist politics, the internal colonial model held that under certain conditions nationalism could continue to persist in the very midst of industrial society. Hechter, noting the salience of cultural affinities over material interests as a basis of development of group solidarity, attempts to account for them by

making use of class analysis. He does not indulge in grand theoretical generalizations and remains confined to his case-study.

Tom Nairn

Tom Nairn believes that the theory of nationalism represents Marxism's "great historical failure".³⁰ Nationalism is a crucial and fairly central feature of the modern capitalist development of world history. Time-bound like other systems of speculation, Marxism did not possess the power to foresee this development, or the eventual, overall shape which capitalist history would assume. In explaining the persistence of nationalism, Nairn believes the cost would be great; the cost would be "Marxism" itself.

Nairn agrees with Wallerstein that the origins of nationalism are to be found in the machinery of the world political economy. It is the location of the state in the world political economy which determines the nature of its ideological response. He emphasizes the role of three factors: (1) the uneven development of capitalism, (2) the entry of popular masses into politics, and (3) the role of cultural factors. These factors require a degree of elaboration.

According to Nairn, the founders of Marxism had been led to believe that the spread of capitalism would be even and smooth. Had it been so, their predictions might have come true. But the actual process was quite uneven. Nairn notes:

Real uneven development has invariably generated imperialism of the centre over the periphery; one after another, these peripheral areas have been forced into a profoundly ambivalent reaction against this dominance,

seeking at once to resist it and to somehow take over its vital forces for their own use. This could only be done by a kind of highly idealistic political and ideological mobilization, by a painful forced march based on their own resources: that is employing their nationality as a basis.³¹

As for the entry of the masses into politics it could only be possible along the lines of nationality. The new middle class intelligentsia "had to invite the masses into history and the invitation card had to be written in the language they understood".

As capitalism spread, and smashed the ancient social formations surrounding it, these always tended to fall apart along the fault lines contained inside them. It is a matter of elementary truth that these lines of fissure where nearly always ones of nationality (although in certain well-known cases deeply established religious divisions could preform the same functions). They were never ones of class As a means of mobilization, nationalism was simply superior to what was contained in a still rudimentary (often one should say, a merely nascent) class consciousness.³²

Thus there was never any chance of an emerging universal proletarian class as predicted by Marx.

On the importance of the cultural factors, he notes:

Nationalism ... actually did provide the masses with something real and important -- something that class consciousness could never have furnished, a culture which however deplorable, larger, more accessible, and more relevant to mass realities than the rationalism of our Enlightenment inheritance. If this is so, then it cannot be true that nationalism is just false consciousness. It must have had a functionality in modern development, perhaps one more important than that of class consciousness.³³

EVALUATION

Marx and Engels had envisioned the movement of history from the capitalist-national state towards the international socialist community. They had accepted nationalism as a historical fact and a necessary stage in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Well aware of the integrative potential of nationalism at the national level and disintegrative potential at the systemic level, they had sought to exploit it for the advantage of the communist movement. They had predicted that integration would eventually be achieved at the international level under socialism.

Lenin refined this position. He realized the instrumental value of nationalism with much greater sophistication than did his contemporaries. He knew that nationalist slogans could be exploited by both the bourgeoisie and the communists. His insistence on self-determination while advocating internationalism at the same time was a brilliant tactical move. He knew how the slogans of pure nationalism or pure internationalism had the potential of degenerating into imperialism. He saw the potential of an alliance between the Soviet Union and the emerging nations and the policy paid off in the long run.

Stalin reiterates Lenin's theses, primarily justifying his position of 'socialism in one country'. The international communitarian goal recedes in the background. The great Russian nationalism which was criticized by Lenin finds no reference in Stalin's writings. Mao was closer to Stalin's position on the nationality question. The right of self-determination was adopted as a party slogan, but in actual practice the Communist Party never

emphasized it, except as a tactical move to gain the support of the minorities during the Long March. After the assumption of power the emphasis clearly shifted towards Chinese nationalism.

A brief survey of post-modernization trends shows that the official Soviet internationalism is more concerned with consolidating the gains rather than advancing them in the ideological spirit. The shift from values to force, a tendency which was manifest in Stalin's writings, becomes increasingly evident in the enunciation of doctrinal position. At the domestic level, the reassertion of the nationality question from the Baltic to Central Asia forced rethinking at the highest policy levels. It is no longer the enthusiasm of internationalism which dominates official pronouncements. It is rather the spectre of disintegration which haunts the highest echelons of leadership.

Dialectical-Marxist writers in the West were faced with a dilemma: how to save the theory, in the face of the facts that nationalism had continued to persist and even reassert, and the goal of socialist internationalism, in which Marx and Lenin believed, was nowhere in sight. Only two alternatives were possible. First, to assert that the basic assumptions of the Marxist theory were still valid but the time frame had been conceived too narrowly by the original propounders of the theory. Second, to admit that the founders had underestimated the cultural factors and the theory had to be reformulated. Both alternatives have been tried. Wallerstein believes that the basic assumptions are still correct but it will take much more time than originally conceived by Marx and Lenin. On the other hand there are others such as Hechter and Naim who believe that the theory must be reformulated.

Marxist writers in the West are attempting to reformulate the Marxist theory in a much broader framework, but the question which must be asked is: how much of Marxism is left in recasting the theory? Tom Naim virtually comes close to repudiating the validity of Marxism in explaining nationalism. His stress on the cultural factors and the importance of nation over class puts him effectively among the national socialists who had been sharply attacked by both Lenin and Stalin. Is it a case of paradigm shift? Any answer to this question would be premature at this stage.

THREE

Islam

At the beginning of the twentieth century, several Muslim writers in different Islamic countries undertook the task of reinterpreting the Islamic tradition in the modern context. Muṣṭafā Kāmil, Muḥammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā from Egypt, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī from Iran, Mahmud Tarazi from Afghanistan, Zia Gokalp from Turkey, and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Iqbal and Syed Amir Ali from India are some of the well-known writers of the time. Because of the colonial rule over most Muslim countries, the liberal culture predominated. Albert Hourani has aptly described the nature of the impact of the Western liberal thought on the Muslim thought of this period:

... this revival took place under the stimulus of European liberal thought, and led to a gradual reinterpretation of Islamic concepts to the guiding principles of European thought of the time: Ibn Khaldūn's *'umrān* gradually turned into Guizot's civilization, the *maṣlaḥa* of the Mālikī jurists and Ibn Taymiyyah into the 'utility' of John Stuart Mill, the *ijmā'* of Islamic jurisprudence into the public opinion of democratic theory, and *those who bind and loose* into members of parliament.¹

From among the early twentieth-century writers, we have chosen Muhammad Iqbal, because of the originality of his thought and the tremendous influence he had on the later writers who expressed themselves on the question of nationalism versus

internationalism in the Islamic tradition. He can rightly be considered the pioneer of contemporary Islamic resurgence.

Traditional Writers: Muhammad Iqbal

Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) was the first modern Muslim philosopher who projected the international ideals of Islam at the beginning of the twentieth century.² His concept of Pan-Islamism was greatly influenced by an earlier Muslim philosopher, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897).³

Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī was a "precursor and early teacher of anti-imperialism ... solidarity against the West, and self-strengthening reforms."⁴ His ideals were pan-Islamic. He advocated that the Muslims should combine nationalism and Pan-Islamism in order to fight imperialism.

Iqbal, who appreciated some positive features of both Liberalism and Marxism, was strongly critical of both the doctrines. He appreciated individual freedom, scientific progress, and the dynamic nature of Western liberalism. But he criticized Western democracy which, for him, in effect meant the dominant participation in politics by a privileged minority, an economy which led to severe injustices both inside and abroad, and a nationalism which bred racialism within and imperialism without. Iqbal also appreciated some positive features of socialism such as its emphasis on economic equality, mass participation and the redress of the extremities of capitalism. However, he criticized its atheism, its disregard of the worth of the individual, and the dictatorship of a class. His final

verdict was: neither capitalism nor socialism could cure the ills of a despairing humanity.

In his view, Pan-Islamism means pan-humanism. Islam's message is universal and is intended for the whole of mankind. Islam's world-view, in his opinion, is based on two basic assumptions: (a) the principle of *Tawhīd* -- that God is one, and (b) that man is God's representative on the earth and a special trustee. Islam elevates man from narrow and parochial concerns and creates a community of believers, an *ummah*. He notes:

Islam is non-territorial in its character, and its aim is to furnish a model for the final combination of humanity by drawing its adherents from a variety of mutually repellent races, and then transforming this atomic aggregate into a people possessing self-consciousness of their own.⁵

It is significant that although Iqbal's argument is couched in the framework of Islamic communitarian perspective, its intent is to create a universal community embracing all mankind. Its purpose is to unite and organize mankind despite all its national distinctions.⁶ In a poem entitled, "Makkah and Geneva", he expresses doubt regarding the usefulness of the League of Nations on the ground that it rests on the idea of uniting nations instead of uniting humanity. The message of Makkah to a world torn by strife among nations is to attack the problem by trying to unify mankind. He observes:

The association of nations has become common these days,
but the unity of mankind remains hidden from human eyes.
The disruption of human communities is the object of

Frankish statesmanship; the object of Islam is the unity of man. Makkah gives this message to Geneva: a League of Nations or a League of human beings?⁷

Iqbal saw the capitalist system imposing an unjust economic and political order over the Muslim world and anticipated the possibilities in the Islamic faith of creating a new kind of world order based on justice. He declare:

The peoples of Asia are bound to rise against the acquisitive economy which the West has developed and imposed on the nations of the East ... The faith you represent recognizes the worth of the individual and disciplines him to give away his all to the service of God and man. Its possibilities are not yet exhausted. It can still create a new world order where the social rank of man is not determined by his caste or colour or the amount of dividends he earns, but by the kind of life he lives; where the poor tax the rich; ... where an untouchable may marry the daughter of a king; where private ownership is a trust and where capital cannot be allowed to accumulate so as to dominate the real producer of wealth. This superb idealism of your faith, however, needs emancipation from the medieval fancies of theologians and legists.⁸

He considers modern nationalism to be an offshoot of liberalism. He rejects it as an alien idea and as antithetical to religion. Its emergence in the West, in Iqbal's view, was made possible because of the peculiar doctrinal orientation of Christianity which emphasized complete other-worldliness, a negative attitude towards the material life, and a duality of spirit and matter.⁹ It is a kind of worship of certain local symbols which came to dominate the West after the erosion of religious values and the consequent

separation between the church and the state. Nationalism displaces religion, serving the functional purpose of new ideology. Iqbal sees its catastrophic consequences for international relations. The pride in one group's achievement inevitably spills over into the imperialistic control of other groups and their exploitation. It leads to national rivalries, wars among nations and the narrowing down of human outlook and sympathy. Above all, it kills humanity. He warned the Muslims:

Liberalism has a tendency to act as a force of disintegration and the race idea which appears to be working in modern Islam with greater force than ever may ultimately wipe off the broad human outlook which Muslim people have imbibed from their religion.¹⁰

Iqbal emphasized to the Muslims that ethnic, racial, and territorial differences have limited utility and are recognized in Islam for purposes identification only. Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism, but a community, a "league of nations", where recognition of artificial boundaries and racial distinctions are for facility of reference only, not for restricting the social horizons of its members. Iqbal's verdict against nationalism is forcefully expressed in the following verses:

Of these new deities, the biggest is the fatherland -- the deity whose garment is the coffin of religion. The rivalry of nations is due to this. The subjugation of nations through commerce is due to this. If politics is devoid of honesty, it is because of this; if the home of the weak is ruined, it is because of this. It is this which divides the creatures of God into nations: it is this which strikes at the root of the nationality of Islam.¹¹

Iqbal was not simply an idealist. He knew that nationalism was a double-edged sword which could also be used to overthrow the yoke of Western imperialism. He adopted the concept of Muslim nationalism with the clear purpose of eventually creating a world Muslim community. He defines the concept of Muslim nationalism in the following terms:

It is not the unity of language or country or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the universe ... that we are members of the society founded by the Prophet of Islam. Islam abhors all material limitations, and bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea objectified in a potentially expansive group of concrete personalities. It is not dependent for its life principle on the character and genius of a particular people. In its essence, it is non-temporal, non-spatial.¹²

Modernization Theorists

It is difficult to select any single writer from among the modernization theorists because of two reasons: (a) There is a remarkable similarity of views among the leaders as well as the intellectuals of the modern period (1919-1970) across the Muslim world. (b) There is little originality in their ideas. They borrow a page either from liberal nationalists or national socialists and combine it with an appeal to ethnic cultures rooted in the past. They are primarily of two types:

- (1) Liberal nationalists of Western variety such as Kamal Atatürk (Turkey), Shah of Iran (Iran), King Amanullah (Afghanistan), Ayub Khan (Pakistan),

Ja'far al-Numayrī (Sudan), Anwar al-Sādāt (Egypt), Suharto (Indonesia), King Husain (Jordan).

- (2) National Socialist variety such as Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir (Egypt), Ḥafīẓ al-Asad (Syria), Ṣaddām Husayn (Iraq), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Pakistan), Sardar Daud Khan (Afghanistan).

The following characteristics are common in the writings of the above leaders:

- (1) They were all nationalists. Some of them paid lip service to internationalism, such as Pan-Arabism, Islamic Internationalism, or Third World internationalism, but they were motivated primarily by the realpolitik considerations rooted in the domestic politics or foreign policy of their countries.
- (2) Their ideologies were of a syncretised variety. They combined liberal or socialist variety of nationalism with the ethnic tradition. The goal in each case was modernization. They believed that modernization was a value-free process and that they could borrow technology without importing ideology. Their model, in most cases, was the West, and in some cases, the Soviet Union.
- (3) Nearly all of them included Islam as one of the factors in the composition of their ideologies. Emphasis on Islam differed from country to country and from one historical period to another, but open hostility to Islam as a religion was rare. Faced with the legitimacy crises, most of them resorted

to Islam and expounded and patronized their own version of official Islam.

We shall confine our discussion only to the views of two leaders who, in ideal-typical sense, represent the Western liberal and national socialist traditions in the muslim world respectively, Muhammad Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan (1958-1969) and Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir, the President of Egypt (1954-1970)

Muhammad Ayub Khan

Muhammad Ayub Khan was an ideal typical modern nation --builder in the Western liberal mould.¹³ He believed that it was enough "to express and practice the spirit of Islam in the language of educated man, which is the language of science, history, economics and world affairs and above all, the language of nationalism". In his view, Pakistan had been won by the secular liberal educated middle class and the Islamists had little claim to make any demand. "Pakistanis," he thought, "did not have a strong sense of nationalism." The ultimate aim of Pakistan was to become "a sound, solid and cohesive nation to be able to play its destined role in world history".

His world-view was primarily confined to developing a pan-Asian community in which he conceived a role for Pakistan. He wrote:

I have viewed problems as a Pakistani, a Muslim and an Asian. In dealing with world affairs, I have viewed problems as an Asian. It is within the Asian community that we have to establish for ourselves a permanent place of respect and strength. This is what our national interest

demands. And this is why we continue to work for peace and stability in this part of the world.¹⁴

He was a strong believer in modernization along Western lines. He believed that it would lead to a greater consolidation of the nation-state. He thought that the creation of a modern infra-structure -- development of roads, spread of education and improvement in the means of communication - would eventually lead to the emergence of a patriotic middle class, which would build a westernized nation-state.

Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir

Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir, (popularly known as Gamal Abdel Nasser), wanted to establish a national socialist Egypt along modern lines¹⁵. He reinterpreted the history of Egypt essentially in nationalist terms beginning from the Pharaohs to the Islamic conquests, eulogizing the uprisings against the Ottomans, the British and other powers which he considered to be imperialist. He believed that Egypt was in need of both political and social revolutions. He wrote:

All people on earth go through two revolutions -- a political revolution that helps them recover their right to self-government from the hands of a despot who had imposed himself upon them, or free themselves from the domination of alien armed forces which had installed themselves in the land against their will; and a social revolution -- a class conflict that ultimately ends in realising social justice for all inhabitants of the country ... We are passing through the gruelling ordeal of experiencing the two revolutions together.¹⁶

His world-view comprises three circles: the Arab circle, the African circle and the Muslim world circle. He wrote:

We cannot look stupidly at a map of the world not realising our place therein, and the role assigned to us by that position. Neither can we ignore that there is an Arab circle surrounding us and that this circle is as much a part of us as we are a part of it; that our history has been merged with it and that its interests are linked with ours.

... there is a continent of Africa in which fate has placed us and which is destined today to witness a terrible struggle for its future. This struggle affects us whether we want it or not.

Can we ignore that there is a Muslim World to which we are tied by bonds forged not only by religious faith but also by the fact of history?¹⁷

Both his domestic and foreign policy agenda are drawn essentially in the nationalist context with scant regard for Islamic internationalism, which has been treated as one of the circles of relatively marginal significance.

Post-Modernization Writers

We present the views of three writers on nationalism and internationalism in Islam: (1) Imam Khomeini (Iran), (2) Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdūdī (Pakistan), (3) Sayyid Qutb (Egypt). It must be clarified at the outset that one does not find any elaborate discussion of nationalism in the writings of these authors. It is

primarily because they are internationalists and believe in the unity of the Muslim community (*ummah*).

Khomeini

Khomeini distinguishes between patriotism and nationalism¹⁸. He regards patriotism as a natural sentiment but rejects nationalism because of two reasons: (a) it is contrary to the Islamic teachings; (b) it is an alien idea propagated by foreigners in order to divide the Muslim community. He notes:

To love one's fatherland and its people and to protect its frontiers are both quite unobjectionable, but nationalism, involving hostility to other Muslim nations, is something quite different. It is contrary to the noble Qur'an and the orders of the most Noble Messenger. Nationalism that results in the creation of enmity between Muslims and splits the ranks of the believers is against Islam and the interests of the Muslims. It is a stratagem concocted by the foreigners who are disturbed by the spread of Islam.¹⁹

He blames that the imperialists have divided the Muslim community by establishing separate nation-states and urges the Muslims to overthrow the existing nation-states:

They have separated the various segments of the Islamic *ummah* from each other and artificially created separate nations In order to attain the unity and freedom of the Muslim people, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence the Islamic government of justice that will be in the service of the people.²⁰

He also blames the imperialists for imposing an unjust order:

... the imperialists have also imposed on us an unjust economic order, and thereby divided our people into two groups: oppressors and oppressed. Hundreds of millions of Muslims are hungry and deprived of all forms of health care and education, while minorities comprised of the wealthy and powerful, live a life of indulgence, licentiousness, and corruption. The hungry and deprived have constantly struggled to free themselves from the oppression of their plundering overlords, and their struggle continues to this day.²¹

Islam is the religion of 'truth and justice'. It is the 'religion of those who desire freedom and independence'. It is the 'school of those who struggle against imperialism'.

Islam is a complete code of life and "there is not a single topic in human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and established a norm". Islamic government may be defined as the 'rule of divine law over men'. Recognizing the ambiguity of the principle of *vilāyat-i-faqīh* (the governance of the jurispudent) as is generally understood, he thinks that the rule by the religious scholars is logically self-evident from the nature of detailed instruction given by Islam and the practice of the Holy Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him). He asserts:

... the true rulers are the *fuqahā'* [religious scholars] themselves, and rulership ought officially to be theirs, to apply to them, not to those who are obliged to follow the guidance of the *fuqahā'* on account of their own ignorance of the law.²²

Khmoeini's criticism of the Shah's monarchy often centres around the social injustice prevalent in Iran. He strongly decries the 'unjust economic order' and the ever growing gap between the 'plundering overlords' and the 'masses'. He also strongly decries Iran's exploitation by the West.

Huge amounts of capital are being swallowed up; our public funds are being embezzled; our oil is being plundered; and our country is being turned into a market for expensive unnecessary goods by the representatives of foreign companies, which make it possible for foreign capitalists and their local agents to pocket the people's money.²³

The purpose of Islamic society is the "establishment of just order", a just society that will morally and spiritually nourish refined human beings.

Sayyid Mawdūdī

Sayyid Mawdudi (1903-1979), a Pakistani scholar whose writings have been most influential in the contemporary Muslim world, believes that Islam is international and its message is universal.

It presents to all mankind a social system of justice and piety based on creed and morality and invites all towards it ... The ultimate goal of Islam is a world state in which the chains of racial and national prejudices would be dismantled and all mankind incorporated in a cultural and political system with equal rights and equal opportunities for all, and in which hostile competition would give way to friendly cooperation between peoples so that they might

mutually assist and contribute to the material and moral good of one another.²⁴

Nationalism is inconsistent with Islam because it divides man from man on the basis of nationality. Nationalism simply means that the nationalist should give preference to his nationality over all other nationalities. Even if a man is not an aggressive nationalist, nationalism at least demands that culturally, economically, politically and legally he should differentiate between one who belongs to one's nation and the others to ensure maximum advantages for his nation; to preserve with tenacity the historical traditions and traditional prejudices and to generate the sentiments of national pride:

He [nationalist] would not admit with him members of other nationalities in any walk of life on an equal basis. Whenever there is a chance of obtaining more advantages, as against each other, his heart would be sealed against all sentiments of justice. His ultimate goal would be nation-state rather than a world state; nevertheless if he upholds any world ideology, that ideology would necessarily take the form of imperialism or world domination, because members of other nationalities cannot participate in his state as equals, they may do so only as slaves or subjects.²⁵

Islam, emphasizes Mawdūdī, is a complete code of life. It does not believe in the separation of religion from society. Its polity is based on four fundamental assumptions: (1) that Allah -- the One True God -- is the only sovereign, a doctrine which serves as the basis of the social and moral system propounded by the Prophet; (2) that man is Allah's vicegerent and is hence not independent of Allah's guidance and directive; (3) that the right

to rule -- within the limits prescribed by Allah -- belongs to the whole community of believers; and (4) that Islamic polity must conduct its affairs by mutual consultation (*shūrā*) among all Muslims.²⁶

The community assumes a special importance in Islam. The *sharī'ah* (Islamic way of life) prescribes directives for the collective life touching upon such matters as "family relationships, social and economic affairs, administration, rights and duties of citizens, judicial system, laws of war and peace, and international relations. In short, it embraces all the various departments of life. The *sharī'ah* is a complete scheme of life and an all-embracing social order wherein "nothing is superfluous and nothing lacking".

Sayyid Quṭb

Quṭb shared many of the ideas of Sayyid Mawdūdī with regard to the world-view of Islam. He strongly believed in the universality of Islam's message. He wrote:

Islam came to elevate man and save him from the bonds of earth and soil, the bonds of flesh and blood ... There is no country for the Muslim except that where the *sharī'ah* of God is established, where human relations are bonded by their relationship to God. There is no nationality for a Muslim except his creed which makes him a member of the Islamic *ummah* in the abode of Islam.²⁷

He emphasized that Islam was markedly different from both liberalism and communism and was, in fact, a distinctive world-view which should be understood in its own terms. He criticized

liberalism for its unlimited individual freedom, unjust economic system and disregard for the community's rights. He also criticized communism for its lack of concern for the individual's rights, and for imposing the dictatorship of one class over the others. Islam, in his view, provides a balance between the two systems. It is superior to both capitalism and communism in the sense that while the other two ideologies are solely materialistic, Islam takes care of both the material and spiritual needs.

Quṭb considered the concept of social justice central to the Islamic polity. Justice in Islam, in his view, donates human equality as well as mutual social responsibility. He notes:

[Islamic social justice] is a comprehensive human justice, and not merely an economic justice, that is to say, it embraces all sides of life and all aspects of freedom. It is concerned alike with the mind and the body, with the heart and the conscience. The values with which this justice deals are not only economic values, nor are they merely material values in general; rather they are a mixture of moral and spiritual values together.²⁸

EVALUATION

Iqbal saw the disintegration of the community as a fact. He considered nationalism as an alien idea and a divisive force operating within the Muslim community. He also saw capitalism imposing an unjust political and economic order on the Muslim world. He responded to the situation at two levels. (1) At the theoretical level he projected the communitarian ideals of Islam, reconstructing the tradition in modern terms. His emphasis on creating a just world

order in accordance with the fundamental values of Islam was the result of this reflection. (2) At the practical level he understood that nationalism was a double-edged sword and could be used to gain independence at the political level. He urged the Muslims to adopt it temporarily in order to move towards the eventual unity and the creation of a new world order.

Modernization theorists, who belonged to the westernized educated classes, accepted the Western nation-state system as the ultimate reality. They were nationalist either of the liberal or of the socialist variety. Their ideologies were of a syncretised character. Our analysis of the views of Muhammad Ayub Khan and Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir reveal that both were primarily concerned with creating strong, cohesive and modern nation-states; one of them wished to create it along the Western liberal lines and the other, along national socialist lines. Their world-views were also drawn primarily in geographical-territorial terms, and public policies were justified with reference to national interest, the implication being that national interest was the highest value. They were little bothered by the ideal of Islamic internationalism.

Post-modernization theorists were internationalists. They insisted on the rejection of nationalism completely, considering it an alien idea to the Islamic tradition, and a cultural form which Western imperialism had imposed on the Muslim world. They challenged the legitimacy of the existing regimes, which they considered unjust, oppressive, and part of the imperialist system of the West. They saw potential integration of the Muslim community as an inevitable trend. They also emphasized understanding the tradition on its own terms. They sought to revive

the tradition, transforming it in the light of changing circumstances. They emphasized social justice as the central purpose of Islamic polity and argued that imperialism violated the sense of Islamic justice.

FOUR

Epilogue

Despite apparent divergences, both Liberalism and Marxism are fundamentally similar in their approach. Both traditions base their theories on the historical patterns observable in Western Europe. Despite their international pretensions, both theories remain ethnocentric. Modernization theorists on both sides believe that nationalism is the product of the early stage of modernization or capitalism. Both stress the integrative aspect of nationalism at one level. Both believe that history is moving towards internationalism with the difference that one is looking at it from the point of view of the capitalist, while the other is looking from the perspective of the labourer. Both claim to be the true heirs of post-Enlightenment rationalism. Both believe in the dichotomy between tradition and modernity. Both regard culture as traditional and primordial. It is also interesting to note the similarity of treatment meted out to Islam by both the doctrines. The liberals treated Islam merely as one of the several component factors of different national cultures. To them, Egyptian Islam, Pakistani Islam, Iranian Islam, and Indonesian Islam differ in fundamental respects. The Marxists also held similar distinctions between Uzbek Islam, Tajik Islam, and Transcaucasian Islam inside the Soviet Union. Both disregarded the international aspect of the tradition until the recent developments in Iran and Afghanistan. The underlying assumption of this approach was that with the advent of modernity, religion would gradually disappear.

Post-modernization writers of both the traditions eventually discovered that the world did not conform to their predecessors' theories. The world which had appeared to be heading towards integration of one kind or the other, was now seen faced with the possibility of disintegration. The rise of both ethno-nationalism and old-state nationalism and religious revivalism, and the retreat of internationalism of both liberal and Marxist varieties were the new realities, or anomalies, of too major a proportion to be ignored. The world increasingly looked chaotic, incomprehensible and meaningless.

The thinkers in the Islamic tradition saw things differently. They observed the worldwide spread of liberalism alongside the spread of capitalism. To them, socialism provided no acceptable alternative either. It was in fact seen as another Western ideology in competition with the entrenched ideology of liberalism. Both were seen fundamentally in conflict with Islam. The Islamic thinkers perceived the spread of capitalism to signify the imposition of an unjust economic and political order over the world. They also noted its divisive effect on the community. Under that dispensation, the community was divided between the oppressors and the oppressed within, and into artificial nation-states without. Nationalism itself was perceived as alien and repugnant to Islam. Traditional Islamic writers argued that while their ideal was a universal *ummah*, the Muslims should for the moment adopt nationalism, or to be more accurate, the idea of liberating the Muslim peoples, one after the other. Iqbal argued that nationalism, in so far as nationalism also implied the liberation of the different collective entities which comprise the Muslim world, it was a necessary step towards the realization of Islamic unity.

Modernization theorists in the Islamic world, who were mostly Western educated, however, while they fought against imperialism, they accepted liberal nationalism as the ultimate reality. Whether liberal or socialist, they tried to copy the Western models. This was a phase of thoroughgoing westernization and modernization, upon which the westernized educated classes had embarked upon with haste and speed. Everything traditional had to be rejected and modernization of outlook and institutions had to be realized. But thirty years of political experimentation with both liberalism and socialism failed to deliver any good. At the domestic level, nearly all Muslim countries suffered from a perpetual legitimacy crisis. The problems of economic and social inequalities increased at a much faster pace than modernization. The sequence of these experiments in modernization -- the imitation of the West, the failure of the borrowed models, the consequent anti-Western backlash -- has repeated itself with remarkable uniformity in most Muslim countries despite perceptible differences in their historical development.

The fundamental contradiction in the situation was that the Muslim countries were not "nation-states" in the Western European sense; rather, they were actually 'states', trying to become 'nations' according to the Western concepts. Nationalism was the ideology of a tiny urban elite while the masses adhered to the international communitarian ideal of Islam. According to Hamid Enayat, a perceptive observer of the Muslim scene:

Nationalism has rarely been the conscious credo of the Muslim masses, whether urban or rural except in its vaguest and most general anti-imperialist or anti-Zionist slogans.

As in the West, the most articulate spokesman and heroes of nationalism in the Muslim countries have arisen from the ranks of the bourgeoisie and the aristocratic establishment. Accordingly their constituency has normally been found among civil servants, teachers, middle-rank army officers and relatively well-to-do tradesmen and shopkeepers The upper and middle classes imbibed Western ideas and practices, but the masses remained loyal to age-old traditions and beliefs.¹

Post-modernization theorists in the Muslim world, mostly schooled in the indigenous educational system, reconstructed their intellectual tradition in terms understandable to those persons reared in the modern intellectual climate. Their major argument is that Islam is a complete scheme of life which should be understood in its own terms. Islam does not need any suffixes such as liberal or socialist. It is a complete world-view which has to be accepted in full, along with its metaphysical assumptions. They argued that the concept of social justice was the central value among the hierarchy of values to which the Islamic order should move. Imperialism, at both the international and domestic levels, violates that central value enshrined in the Islamic teachings. The achievement of political power is essential in order to realize that objective. They recognized ethnic distinctions, but rejected nationalism completely, and considered it a political form of cultural imperialism imposed by the West. They effectively argued that genuine liberation was not possible without rejecting all alien ideologies and resurrecting the indigenous tradition in its purity.

While the contemporary writers in both the Liberal and Marxist traditions recognize that nationalism is the dominant and

natural form of politics, the Islamic perspective suggests that nationalism is an alien form imposed by the colonial powers. The existing Muslim states are seen by the Islamic writers as the guardians of the European culture. Cultural liberation, in their view, is possible only when the Muslim community (*ummah*) gets rid of this form and moves towards communitarian internationalism.

Our own study and analysis of the subject makes us seriously question the commonly accepted thesis that the nation-state is the universally accepted unit of international system. We argue that the Muslim countries are not nation-states on the Western European pattern, but in fact they are states which are trying to be nations according to the Western norms. But they are facing a serious challenge from Islamic communitarian internationalism, an indigenous transnational Islamic identity. It would be premature, however, to make any definitive judgement at the moment about the final outcome of the competition between loyalty to the nation-state and loyalty to the world Muslim community. Nevertheless, it is clear that nationalism is engaged in a serious battle with Islamic communitarian internationalism.

Our analysis also suggests that the emergence of Islamic communitarian internationalism represents both a reaction against the two Western traditions, Liberalism and Marxism, as well as the affirmation of its own identity. It is a world-view that needs to be understood on its own terms. Social justice occupies the central position in the hierarchy of values towards which the Islamic order should move. Understanding this tradition in its own right is important for any international relations theorist who genuinely wants to understand the complexity of international realities.

Our analysis also suggests that most discussions under the term 'international' are really centred at the communitarian international level. Each tradition perceives the world in the light of its own values. Each tradition seeks to see the unity of the world in its own image and is perceived as imperialistic when seen from the other tradition's point of view. There is little or no attempt to go beyond one's own values and to understand the perspectives of others. We believe that despite the apparent incompatibility of values, there are many similarities across the different cultural traditions. Any analysis of the content of those values and the shared degree of consensus across these traditions is outside the scope of this paper, but we tend to believe that the stability of any world order would depend largely on the degree to which it conforms or diverges from those shared values.

Notes

Introduction

1. See A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), vol I.
2. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1967).
3. Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (Lahore: Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1975).
4. Liberalism expected the decline of nationalism because "trade flows across frontiers; the life of the intellect ignores frontiers; and with the progress of learning, wealth, and industry, the prejudices and superstitions and fears which engender frontiers would decline". Marxism foretold its decline because "industrial workers were forced to be mobile and rootless; their labour a homogeneous and undifferentiated commodity. They could have no local associations, let alone loyalties, as little as a small produced object can be a differentiating part of a local tradition". Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp.147-148. By 'liberalism' we mean "the dominant ideology of the West.... Liberalism in its contemporary form is not so much a set of ideas or doctrines to which people subscribe by conscious choice; it is a way of seeing the social world, and a set of assumptions about it, which are absorbed by the individual in so natural and gradual a manner that he or she is not conscious of their being assumptions at all". For an excellent discussion see Anthony Alblaster, *The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism* (New York, Basil Blackwell, 1984).
5. See the three recent books dealing with the re-emergence of nationalism in the first, second, and third worlds respectively: E.A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, *New Nationalisms of the Developed West*, (Boston: Allen & Unwin,

- 1985); Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
6. K.J. Holsti observes: "...no major approach to international relations theory has emphasized the prominence of nationalist behaviors as an important characteristic of the contemporary international system". K.J. Holsti, "Change in the International System: Interdependence, Integration, and Fragmentation", in Ole R. Holsti and R.M. Siverson, eds., *Change in the International System*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1980).
 7. Gale Stokes, "The Undeveloped Theory of Nationalism", *World Politics*, (October 1978); Arthur N. Waldron, "Theories of Nationalism and Historical Explanations", *World Politics*, (April 1985).
 8. See the introduction in Anthony D.S. Smith, *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 1979).
 9. Some well-known works are the following: Hamid Enyat, "The Resurgence of Islam", *History Today*, (February 1980). See also his book, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas, 1982); Mohammad Ayoob, ed., *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*, (London: Croom Helm, 1981); Ali E.L. Dessouki, *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982); R.H. Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, (New York: Syracuse University Press 1985); John Donahue and J.L. Esposito, *Islam in Transition: Religion and Socio-Political Change*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982); John L. Esposito, *Islam and Development*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980); John L. Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); G.H. Jansen, *Militant Islam*, (London: Pan Books, 1979); V.S. Naipaul, *Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey*, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1981); C.K. Pullapilly, ed., *Islam in the Contemporary World*, (Indiana: Cross road Books, 1980). Philip Stoddard et al., eds., *Change and the Muslim World*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981). For a useful bibliography see *The Muslim World Book Review*, (Summer 1982).
 10. For two representative opinions among the Western liberals, see Ernest Gellner's introduction in *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam*, ed., Said A. Arjomand, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984). From the Soviet perspective, see "Analyzing Islam's Reactionary Movements" in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIV, no. 32, 8 September, 1982.
 11. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
 12. For an interesting book which attempts to deal with Indian, Chinese, and Islamic traditions with reference to development issues see C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Development Regardless of Culture?*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984).
- ### One Liberalism
1. A.J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vols. I and II, (London: Oxford University Press, 1947, 1957).
 2. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 312-313.
 3. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 204.
 4. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp.8-9.
 5. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 241.
 6. E.H. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 85-88.
 7. The following discussion is based on E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After*, (London: Macmillan, 1945).
 8. For an excellent article see Ken Wolf, "Hans Kohn's Liberal Nationalism", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 4, (October-December, 1976), pp. 651-672.
 9. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 16.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
11. Ken Wolf (1976), p. 672.
12. C.J.H. Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion*, (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p.6.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
14. C.J.H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, (New York: Rick R. Smith, 1931).
15. Hayes (1960), p. 109.
16. Hayes (1931), p. 308.
17. K.W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*, (New Jersey: Doubleday, 1954); K.W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); E.B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).
18. K.W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and its Alternative*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 190.
19. Haas (1964).
20. Robert O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, "International Interdependence and Integration", in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 8, (Reading, Ma., Addison-Wesley, 1975; see also chap. 5; *International Organization*, Special Issue on Transnational Relations, vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 1971).
21. S.D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes, International Organization*, 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), p. 185.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 499.
23. K.J. Holsti, "Change in the International System: Interdependence, Integration and Fragmentation", in Ole R. Holsti and R.M. Siverton, eds., *Change in the International System*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 29.
24. K.W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953).
25. Deutsch (1969), p. 25.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

27. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
28. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-46.
30. Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying", *World Politics*, (April 1962).
31. William J. Foltz, "Modernization and Nation-Building: The Social Mobilization Model Reconsidered", in Richard Merritt and Bruce M. Russett, eds., *From National Development to Global Community*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 31.
32. Connor (1982), p. 322.
33. *Ibid.*, 20c. cit.
34. A.D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, (New York: Holmer & Meier, 1983).
35. A.D. Smith, *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, (New York, New York University Press, 1979).
36. Smith (1983), Introduction.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
39. See Appendix, *Ibid.*, p. 260.
40. A.D. Smith, "Ethnic and Nation in the Modern World" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 14, no.2, Summer 1985.
41. For an excellent review article see Crawford Young, "The Temple of Ethnicity," *World Politics*, (July 1983).
42. The primordialists are Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States," in C. Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States*, (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1968); Harold Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).
43. Some instrumentalists are Joseph Rothschild, *Ethno-Politics: A Conceptual Framework*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Paul R. Brass, "Ethnicity and National Formalism," *Ethnicity*, vol. 3, no. 3, (Sept. 1976), pp. 225-

241; Nelson Kasfir, "Explaining Ethnic Political Participation," *World Politics*, vol. 31, no. 3 (April 1979), pp. 365-388.

44. Smith's view contrasts with that of Hannah Arendt who, like Carleton Hayes, believes that nationalism, racism, imperialism, and fascism are on the same continuum, one transforming into the other because of the failure of the nation-state. See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, vols. I-III, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1951).

Two Marxism

1. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1967), p.84.
2. See an excellent article by Joseph Petrus, "Marx and Engels on the National Question," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 33, (1971), pp. 797-825.
3. Marx and Engels (1967).
4. For a good discussion see chapter in Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
5. Vladimir Lenin, *Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalist*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1953), p.30.
6. Alfred D. Low, *Lenin on the Question of Nationality*, (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958).
7. Lenin (1953).
8. Cited in Walker Connor (1984), p. 29.
9. Horace B. Davis, ed., *The National Question: Selected Writings of Rosa Luxemburg*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).
10. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
11. Lenin (1953), p. 18.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
19. This discussion is based on two of his works. Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and National and Colonial Questions*, (New York: International Publishers, n.d.) and *The National Question and Leninism*, (Calcutta: Mass Publications, 1976).
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.
21. Walker Connor (1984), chapter four.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
25. For a balanced article which makes a dispassionate analysis of the Soviet nationality problems see Gail W. Ladipus, "Ethno-nationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case", *World Politics* (July 1984).
26. *Pravda*, February 24, 1981 cited in *ibid.*, p.556.
27. *Pravda*, December 22, 1982, cited in *ibid.*, p.556.
28. Peter D. Philips and Immanuel Wallerstein, "National and World Identities and the Interstate System", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (Summer 1985).
29. Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985).
30. Tom Nairn, "The Modern Janus", *New Left Review*, (November-December, 1985).
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*

Three Islam

1. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p.344.
2. Iqbal was an outstanding poet and philosopher who wrote in three languages, Urdu, Persian and English. The work under consideration here is Sir Muhammad Iqbal, *The*

- Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (Lahore, S.M. Ashraf, 1944).
3. Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamāl ad dīn 'al-Afghānī*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
 4. See Sharif al Mujahid, "Muslim Nationalism: Iqbal's Synthesis of Pan-Islamism and Nationalism" *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, vol. 2, no. 1, (July 1985).
 5. Iqbal (1944), p. 169.
 6. For an excellent article on Iqbal's thoughts on nationalism see Zafar Ishaq Ansari, "Iqbal and Nationalism," *Iqbal Review*, (April, 1961), pp. 51-89.
 7. Muhammad Iqbal, *Ḍarb-i-Kalīm*, (Lahore, 1959), pp. 54-55.
 8. Shamloo, ed., *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, (Lahore: Al-Manar Academy, 1949), p. 54.
 9. See Zafar Ishaq Ansari (1961).
 10. Iqbal (1944), p. 169.
 11. Muhammad Iqbal, *Bāng-i-Dirā*, (Lahore, 1959), pp. 173-74.
 12. S.A. Vahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, (Lahore: Ashraf, 1964), p. 396.
 13. Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
 14. *Ibid.*
 15. Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, (Cairo: Ministry of National Guidance, U.A.R., n.d.)
 16. *Ibid.*
 17. Imam Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, tr. Hamid Algar, (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1991).
 18. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
 20. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
 22. *Ibid.*
 23. Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdūdī, *Nationalism and India*, (Pathankot: Maktaba-i-Jama'at-i-Islami, 1967).

24. *Ibid.*
25. Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdūdī, *Political Theory of Islam*, (Lahore: 1960).
26. Sayyid Quṭb, *Social Justice in Islam*, (Cairo, n.d.)
27. *Ibid.*

Four Epilogue

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The Western World is moving beyond the confines of nation-states and towards the formation of a supra-national community. The Marxist World, threatened by ethno-national movements with disintegration, is going through a basic transformation and is in process of liberating itself from its intellectual legacy. The Muslim World is caught up between two trends: loyalty to the nation-state and to the wider loyalty of the *ummah*. The cold war is over, and yet - thanks to the clash of ideas and the conflict of ethnic and national loyalties - the world might be heading for a major re-shaping of its political map.

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This study seeks to come into grips with the dilemma of nationalism versus internationalism in three major traditions of the world - Liberalism, Marxism and Islam. The work underscores the necessity of a genuine international understanding and dialogue as a necessary step towards building a more peaceful world order.
